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Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

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The catalytic shock of the end of the Cold War and the apparent inability of international relations (IR) theory to predict this profound change have raised questions about how we should go about understanding the world of today. Our inherited tools and ways of describing the international arena seem not to work as well as they once did. To explain and predict the behavior of the human collectivities comprising nation-states, IR theory requires a theory of human political choice. Within the study of IR, foreign policy analysis (FPA) has begun to develop such a theoretical perspective. From its inception, FPA has involved the examination of how foreign policy decisions are made and has assumed that human beings, acting individually or in collectivities, are the source of much behavior and most change in international politics. This article reviews the field of foreign policy analysis, examining its research core and its evolution to date. The overview also looks forward, pointing to the future, not only of FPA itself, but to the implications that future developments in FPA may have for the study of international relations.

Students coming of age in the post–Cold War era seem to grasp intuitively that the study of international relations (IR) is ultimately about human beings, and that the ways in which human beings engage in such relations are difficult to simplify. Contemporary students balk at the classic simplifying assumptions of mainstream IR theory more readily than did their counterparts during the Cold War years. John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93:55) articulates this reaction when he argues that international relations are conducted by:

> conscious entities capable of reacting to, and often modifying, the variables and conditions they encounter. They can at times see the future taking shape; they can devise, within limits, measures to hasten, retard, or even reverse trends. If molecules had minds of their own, chemists would be much less successful in predicting their behavior. It is no wonder that the effort to devise a "molecular" approach to the study of politics did not work out. . . . The simple persistence of *values* in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls.

The catalytic shock of the end of the Cold War and the apparent inability of IR theory to predict this profound change (Gaddis, 1992/93; Haftendorn and Tuschoff, 1993) have raised questions about how we should go about understanding today's world. Our inherited tools and ways of describing the international

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arena seem not to work as well as they once did. It is time to reevaluate the theories and concepts that comprise the IR tool kit, saving those that have proven useful, changing or discarding those that have not, and addressing the gaps that have arisen.

This article addresses one such gap. It proposes, like Gaddis, that to explain and predict the behavior of the human collectives comprising nation-states, IR requires a theory of human political choice. It further asserts that one area within the study of IR that has begun to develop such a theoretical perspective is foreign policy analysis (FPA). From its inception, FPA has involved the examination of how foreign policy decisions are made and has assumed that the source of much behavior and most change in international politics is human beings, acting individually or in collectivities.

Although certain balances of power in the international system, such as the Cold War bipolar system, may constrain the activities of these human actors, it becomes apparent with every system transformation that human will and imagination are major influences in shaping world affairs. During periods of stability, predicting general patterns of international behavior without reference to the human actors involved may not lead scholars astray. The Cold War period can perhaps be seen as the golden age of such theories. Nevertheless, even during such periods, "actor-general" theories (those that focus on the state as a unitary actor and systemic as well as relational variables as determinants of action) will be limited to posing and exploring ahistorical, noncomplex, global trends and issues that affect the system as a whole. As Fareed Zakaria (1992:198) puts it, "The parsimony of systemic theory is useful for some purposes . . . [however, d]omestic politics explanations can be more useful in explaining events, trends, and policies that are too specific to be addressed by a grand theory of international politics." (See also Ripley, 1993.)

Actor-general theory can be contrasted with what Alexander George (1993) has referred to as "actor-specific" theory. This latter type of theory investigates the *sources of change* in the conditions under which actor-general theory is applicable. It also looks for the *sources of diversity* within a given international system—both among individuals and among various collectivities. These factors represent the specifics that actor-general theories assume but do not investigate. In FPA, knowledge about these missing specifics is considered highly relevant and operationally knowable. In effect, FPA provides an alternative to the "black-boxing" of the inner workings of nations common to actor-general theories. It unpacks the box by examining foreign policy decision making. In essence, FPA takes a foreign policy decision-making approach to the study of IR.

How do international relations look when viewed through the lens of FPA? First and formemost, the decision-making approach of FPA breaks apart the monolithic view of nation-states as unitary actors. It focuses on the people and units that comprise the state. For example, "the United States" could mean certain individuals (the president, secretary of state, secretary of defense), a set of bureaucratic agencies (the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency), or certain formally constituted groups with a mandate involving international affairs (the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives). Indeed, for any one problem, all these entities could be doing things at once—and their actions may not logically fit together into a coherent "U.S. policy." Moreover, for scholars involved in FPA, "the national interest," a concept that lies at the heart of the realist analysis of IR, is more productively viewed as the interests of various players—not all of which may coincide, and not all of which are coherently related to anything resembling an objective national interest.

FPA researchers also do not assume that decision makers will act in a classically

rational fashion. FPA builds on what the social sciences—psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, geography—are learning about human decision making. Much of this research is in response to Herbert Simon's classic challenge: "It is far easier to calculate the rational response to a fully specified situation than it is to arrive at a reasonable specification of the situation. And there is no way, without empirical study, to predict which of innumerable reasonable specifications the actors will adopt" (Simon, 1985:303). This challenge to the concept of "rationality" generated what has become known as the "cognitive revolution." In general, the resulting scholarship has found that human rationality is *bounded.* People satisfice rather than optimize. They neither possess nor seek perfect information. They seem incapable of considering more than two or three alternatives at a given time. They process information in different ways under stress than under routine conditions. Furthermore, because any situation can be interpreted in a myriad of ways depending on the historical precedents used, the personalities and experiences of the individuals interpreting the situation and their social and cultural predispositions are important in making decisions. Hidden agendas, such as the need to maintain group consensus or the desire to protect or extend "turf," can undermine a rational cataloging of expected costs and benefits. Emotional and ideological motivations can similarly undercut a rational cost/benefit analysis. Moreover, the greater the number of people involved in a decision, the greater the complexity of the decision calculus.

Unpacking the black box of foreign policy decision making adds much detail to the analysis of IR. The upside of such detail is that we can explain in a more specific fashion what nations are likely to do in particular circumstances. The downside is that elegant and parsimonious theories, portrayed by mathematical and statistical functions or "billiard ball" models, will prove elusive. By focusing on actor-specific detail, FPA is engaged in "concrete theorizing" as opposed to the "abstract theorizing" of actor-general theory. As Lane (1990:927) has observed, "Concrete theory is defined by a cluster of attributes—emphasis on governmental or other political elites, on strategic decision-making processes freed from narrow notions of economic rationality, and on a concern with the environment and institutions within which choice occurs." This form of theorizing, she notes, "achieves universality; but by burrowing, not rising. It strips away all inessential attributes and lays bare a central process that underlies and serves to explain observed political events." Such concrete, actor-specific theory serves as the interface between abstract, actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world.

In other words, concrete, actor-specific theory involves the "specification of the situation" to which Herbert Simon alluded. This work, the research core of FPA, is data intensive; it often requires country or regional expertise; and it is time consuming. Despite these requirements, the number of scholars engaged in this type of theorizing and research is growing. In part, this is because the concepts and theories of FPA are generally as applicable to domestic as to foreign policy choice. The personal characteristics of leaders, argumentation and discourse, problem representation, creativity and learning, advisory processes, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, opposition groups, domestic political imperatives, and so forth affect *all* policymaking, not just foreign policymaking (Beasley and Ripley, 1995). Theories about these phenomena are as useful to those engaged in comparative politics as to those in FPA and IR.

But interest in FPA has also grown because the questions being asked in FPA are those for which we most need answers in the post–Cold War era. There is no longer a stable and predictable system in the international arena. Now, more than ever, objectively operationalized indices do not seem to provide sufficient inputs to ensure the success of simplified expected utility equations. What will Saddam

Hussein's Iraq do if the international community does not lift the sanctions placed against it? What foreign policy effects will result from the impending demise of Deng Hsiao-ping? Questions such as these cannot be answered by abstract actor-general theory, *unless it is integrated with concrete actor-specific theory.* Even before the end of the Cold War, Richard Herrmann (1988:177) noted that, precisely because very few real-world, real-time international problems are adequately dealt with at the abstract level, "it is not surprising that many realists have abandoned the high ground of the macro-level and have come down to the trenches of real political analysis."

This article provides an overview of the field of foreign policy analysis, examining its research core and its evolution to date. It presents a genealogy of FPA, suggesting how its roots have led to three different approaches to the study of foreign policy decision making and three different types of knowledge. Each of these streams of FPA adds to our understanding of why certain foreign policy decisions are made at particular points in time. The article also looks to the future, not only of FPA itself, but to the implications that future developments in FPA may have for the study of international relations.

Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday: Roots

The study of internation or interstate relations is as old as the existence of nation-states themselves. Foreign policy analysis as a distinct and consciously theoretical enterprise, however, did not exist before World War II. FPA is fundamentally a theoretical enterprise informed by empirical investigation; it focuses on making at least part of one's knowledge generalizable and applicable cross-nationally (within certain limits). Atheoretical descriptions or prescriptions for foreign policy, as well as explanations that are not even minimally generalizable, are excluded.

An examination of the beginnings of FPA suggests that three works form the foundation or, perhaps better, the roots of this field:

- "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" by James N. Rosenau (1966).
- *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (1954), a monograph by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin whose ideas were revised and expanded in their 1963 book (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1963).
- *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956), which was expanded and revised first in article form (Sprout and Sprout, 1957) and then in their 1965 book *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics.*

Each of these works played a major role in launching a different aspect of FPA research as we know it today.

James Rosenau's pretheorizing encouraged scholars to tease out cross-nationally applicable generalizations about the foreign policy behavior of states in a systematic and scientific fashion. As Rosenau (1966:98–9) put it:

> To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. . . . Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations. . . . Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory.

Rosenau felt that general, testable theory was needed, and the intent of his article was to point out the direction in which he believed it lay. The general theory Rosenau advocated, however, was not the grand theory of Cold War IR. The metaphor Rosenau used is instructive in this regard: FPA researchers should emulate Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, who was able to differentiate types of plants through careful observation and comparison. Translated to FPA, Rosenau wondered if there are distinct types of nation-states, knowledge of which would confer explanatory and predictive power on our models of foreign policy interaction. He encouraged the development of middle-range theory—theory that mediated between grand principles and the complexity of reality. At the time, Rosenau felt the best way to uncover such middle-range generalizations was through aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation. He also underscored the need to integrate information at several levels of analysis—from individual leaders to the international system. For Rosenau, explanations of foreign policy needed to be multilevel and multicausal, synthesizing information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.

In contrast, the work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues inspired researchers to look within the nation-state level of analysis and to emphasize the players involved in making foreign policy:

> We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in a dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision makers. Hitherto, precise ways of relating domestic factors have not been adequately developed (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1954:53).

In taking this approach, Snyder and his colleagues bequeathed to FPA its characteristic emphasis on foreign policy decision making as opposed to foreign policy outcomes. According to them (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1954:12), "If one wishes to probe the 'why' questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say *that the 'why' questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision-making.*" Decision making was best viewed as "organizational behavior," which took into account the spheres of competence of the actors involved, the flow of communication and information, and the motivations of the various players. Thus, like Rosenau, Snyder and his colleagues believed that explanations of behavior were of necessity both multicausal and interdisciplinary.

Harold and Margaret Sprout sought to add reality to the analysis of foreign policy in a different way: by contextualizing it. Their contribution to the formation of the field suggested that understanding foreign policy outputs (which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system) without reference to foreign policy undertakings (which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions) was misguided. "Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an undertaking, there can be no achievement—and nothing to explain or estimate" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:225). To explain undertakings, the researcher needed to look at the *psycho-milieu* of the individuals and groups making a foreign policy decision. The psycho-milieu is the international context as perceived and interpreted by decision makers. Incongruities between the perceived and the objective international environments can occur, leading to less than satisfactory choices in

foreign policy. The sources of these incongruities were diverse, once again requiring multicausal explanations drawn from a variety of fields. Even in these early years, the Sprouts saw a clear difference between foreign policy analysis and actor-general theory:

> Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's probable motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist—be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist—undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies (Sprout and Sprout, 1965:118).

The combined message of these three works was powerful in its appeal to scholars interested in analyzing states' foreign policy behavior. The theoretical impact of these pieces is summarized in the following propositions:

- knowledge about the particularities of the people making foreign policy decisions is critical to understanding the nature of these choices;
- information about these particularities needs to be incorporated as instances of larger categories of variation in the process of building cross-national, middle-range theory;
- multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the macro, should be integrated in the service of such theory building;
- concepts and theories from all the social sciences can contribute to this theory-building endeavor;
- understanding the foreign policymaking process is at least as important, if not more important, than understanding foreign policy outputs.

The substance of this message was and continues to be the hard core of FPA. Other parts of the message were more temporally bounded. For example, methodological stances that seemed self-evident in the early 1960s have not stood the test of time. They engendered troubling paradoxes that plagued the field and led to a temporary decline in some areas between the mid- and late-1980s. Despite these paradoxes, those who first built on these seminal works from the late 1960s to the 1980s—the first generation of FPA researchers—built an enduring intellectual foundation.

Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday: First Generation

The energy and enthusiasm that characterized the first generation of work in FPA brought about great strides in conceptualization—the results of which still play a vital role today. They also resulted in significant efforts in data collection and experimentation with various methodologies. The overview that follows includes a representative sampling of research that both examines how the "specifics" of nations lead to differences in foreign policy choice/behavior and puts forward propositions that have the potential to be generalizable and applicable cross-nationally. There is no pretense that all relevant works have been included. The works themselves are grouped according to the exemplar—Rosenau (comparative foreign policy), Snyder et al. (foreign policy decision making), or the Sprouts (foreign policy context)—on which they appear to build. This categorization scheme, however, does not imply that a specific scholar perceived his/her work as a conscious attempt to forward the research agenda of a particular exemplar. The categorization serves only as a heuristic device.

Comparative Foreign Policy

Those who took up Rosenau's challenge, to build a cross-national and multilevel theory of foreign policy and to subject that theory to rigorous aggregate empirical testing, created the area of study known as comparative foreign policy (CFP). It is in CFP that we most directly see the legacy of behavioralism in FPA's genealogy. Whereas foreign policy could not be studied in the aggregate, foreign policy behavior could. Searching for an analog to the "vote," which had become the fundamental explanandum in behavioralist American political studies, CFP researchers proposed the foreign policy "event." The event is the tangible artifact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy. It specifies "who does what to whom, and how" in the relations among states. Foreign policy events can be compared along behavioral dimensions, such as whether positive or negative affect (friendliness versus hostility) is displayed, what instruments of statecraft (for example, diplomatic, military, or economic) are used to make the influence attempt, or what level of commitment of resources is evident. Behaviors as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit could now be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion.

This conceptualization of the dependent variable was essential to the theory-building enterprise of CFP. To uncover lawlike generalizations, one would have to conduct empirical testing across different types of nations and across time; case studies were not an efficient methodology for this purpose. With the conceptual breakthrough of the event, however, it was now possible to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determine (by analyzing the variance in the events' behavioral dimensions) the patterns by which these independent variables were correlated with foreign policy behavior (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). Indeed, some scholars involved in CFP research seemed to believe that the goal was the creation of a "grand unified theory" that could take into account a variety of foreign policy behaviors across different types of states and points in time. Some set of master equations would link together all the relevant variables, independent and dependent, and, when applied to massive data bases, would yield R-squares approaching 1.0. Although the goal was perhaps naive in its ambition, the sheer enormousness of the task called forth immense efforts in theory building, data collection, and methodological innovation that have few parallels in the study of IR.

Events Data. The collection of "events data" was funded to a significant degree by the United States government. Andriole and Hopple (1981) estimate that the government (primarily the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation) provided over $5 million for the development of events data sets between 1967 and 1981. Generally speaking, events were collected by combing through newspapers, chronologies, and government documents. They were then categorized according to a set of coding rules that often varied by the purpose the data were meant to address. Some of these events data projects live on either because data are still being collected (for example, Gerner et al., 1994), or because existing data are still useful as a testing ground for hypotheses (for example, the World Event/Interaction Survey [WEIS], the Conflict and Peace Data Bank [COPDAB], Comparative Research on the Events of Nations [CREON]).

Integrated Explanations. In contrast to FPA researchers who built on the other exemplars, CFP researchers were explicitly interested in developing *integrated multilevel* explanations. The five most ambitious research programs were (1) the work growing out of the Inter-Nation Simulation (Guetzkow, 1963); (2) research related

to Michael Brecher's (1972) decision-making studies; (3) the Dimensions of Nations (DON) project (Rummel, 1977, 1972); (4) the CREON project (East, Salmore, and Hermann, 1978; Callahan, Brady, and Hermann, 1982); and (5) the Interstate Behavior Analysis project (Wilkenfeld et al., 1980). In each of these projects, independent variables at several levels of analysis were linked by theoretical propositions (sometimes instantiated in statistical or mathematical equations) to properties or types of foreign policy behavior. At least four of the five attempted to confirm or disconfirm the propositions by aggregate empirical testing. Unfortunately, the empirical results of these and other studies were disappointing, especially in the context of the very high aspirations of CFP researchers. These results ushered in a period of disenchantment with the CFP approach to FPA beginning in the late 1970s.

Foreign Policy Decision Making

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954) had emphasized the process and structure of groups in explaining foreign policy decisions. Their original conceptualization was subsequently extended through a series of case studies which Snyder conducted in collaboration with Glenn Paige (Snyder and Paige, 1958; Paige, 1968, 1959). However, numerous other scholars echoed this theme in their work, which ranged from the study of foreign policy making in very small groups to the study of foreign policy making in large organizations and bureaucracies.

Small Group Dynamics. Some of the most theoretically rich work produced during this first generation of FPA research centered on the consequences of making foreign policy decisions in small groups. Social psychologists had explored the unique dynamics of small group decision settings, but never in relation to foreign policy decision making for which the stakes appeared to be much higher. Probably the most influential work is that of Irving Janis, whose seminal *Victims of Groupthink* (1972) almost single-handedly launched a new research tradition. Using studies drawn specifically from the realm of foreign policy, Janis demonstrated that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision-making quality. The empirical research of Leana (1975), Semmel and Minix (1979), Tetlock (1979), Semmel (1982) and others extended Janis' work using experimental data as well as case studies. Groupthink became one of several possible outcomes in the work of Charles Hermann (1978). He categorized groups along several dimensions (size, role of leader, rules for decision, autonomy of group participants) and made general predictions about the likely outcome of deliberations in each type of group.

Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. Building on Snyder et al.'s view that foreign policy decision making was organizational behavior, first generation FPA researchers also articulated a strong research program that examined the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision making (Huntington, 1960; Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, 1962; Hilsman, 1967; Neustadt, 1970; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Halperin and Kanter, 1973; Halperin, 1974). In his now classic *Essence of Decision,* Graham Allison (1971) offered three ways of explaining one episode in foreign policy—the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Investigating both the U.S. and the Soviet sides of this case, Allison showed that the unitary rational actor model of foreign policy decision making was least sufficient as an aid in understanding the curiosities of the crisis. The two additional models, which were postulated as successive "cuts" at explanation (the

organizational process model, focusing on intraorganizational factors, and the bureaucratic politics model, centering around interorganizational factors), allowed Allison to explain more fully what transpired. His use of three levels of analysis suggests the need to integrate rather than segregate explanations at different levels. Morton Halperin's book, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974), presented an extremely detailed amalgam of generalizations about bureaucratic behavior, accompanied by examples from American defense policymaking during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. It should be noted that bureaucratic politics research gained impetus from the Vietnam War, which was ongoing during this period, because that war was seen by the public as defense policy gone astray due, in part, to bureaucratic imperatives (Krasner, 1971).

Overall, research on groups, organizational processes, and bureaucratic politics showed how "rational" foreign policymaking can be upended by the political entities through which decision makers must work. These entities put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities. This survival is measured by such things as relative influence vis-à-vis other organizations, the level of the organization's budget, and the morale of its personnel. Groups jealously guard and seek to increase their influence. They seek to preserve undiluted what they feel is their "essence" or "mission." Large organizations develop standard operating procedures (SOPs), which, while allowing them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or creativity. These SOPs may be the undoing of innovative solutions devised by decision makers at levels above such organizations, but there is little alternative to the implementation of policy by bureaucracy. The interface between policy *objectives* and policy *implementation* is directly met at this point. When there is incompatibility among the players' perspectives, there may be substantial slippage between the two.

Foreign Policy Context

The mind of a foreign policymaker is not a tabula rasa. It contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, and conceptions of nation and self. Each decision maker's mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates. The Sprouts referred to these as the milieu of decision making, and scholarly efforts to explore that milieu were both innovative and impressive among members of this first generation of FPA researchers. Michael Brecher's (1972) work, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel,* stands as an exemplar of research building on this contextual perspective. It explores the psycho-cultural environment within Israel and links that milieu to the country's foreign policy behavior. Unlike Brecher's integrative approach to the psychosocial milieu, however, most works in this area either examined the psychological aspects of foreign policy decision making more narrowly, or looked only at the impact of broader social and cultural factors.

Individual Characteristics. Would there be a distinct field of FPA without the study of leaders' individual characteristics—this most micro of all explanatory levels? Arguably not. It is, in fact, in the cognition and information processing of the decision maker that all the explanatory levels of FPA become integrated. What sets FPA apart from more mainstream IR is its insistence that a "compelling explanation [of foreign policy] cannot treat the decider exogenously" (Hermann and Kegley, 1995:514).

Under certain conditions—high stress, high uncertainty, dominant position in foreign policy decision making—the personal characteristics of the individual leader can become central in understanding foreign policy choice (Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1989). Harold Lasswell's (1930, 1948) writings on political leadership were a significant influence on many early pioneers studying the effects of leaders on foreign policymaking. Joseph de Rivera's (1968) *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* remains an excellent survey and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to foreign policy cases. Another early effort at the systematic study of leader effects involved the concept of "operational code," an idea originating with Leites (1951) but refined and extended by Alexander George (1969) to indicate how decision makers' beliefs could help to shape foreign policy specifically. Identifying an operational code includes assessing the core political beliefs of leaders regarding the inevitability of conflict in the world, their personal ability to change events, as well as their preferred means and style of pursuing goals (Holsti, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Walker, 1977). Using a modified operational code framework, Margaret Hermann (1974, 1980a, 1980b) examined how leaders' beliefs, motivations, decisional styles, and interpersonal styles influenced what their states did in the international arena. She integrated information on individual characteristics into a more holistic picture, describing a set of orientations toward foreign policy that allowed for specific projections about a leader's behavior in a variety of foreign policy circumstances.

Exploration of how elites perceived the international environment and the images they had of others in the world also played an important role in this first generation of research on foreign policy decision making. The work of both Robert Jervis and Richard Cottam deserve special mention. Jervis' (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* and Cottam's (1977) *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* both explicate the potentially grave consequences of inaccurate perception in foreign policy situations by exploring its roots. For example, deterrence strategies can fail catastrophically if inaccurate perception of the other's intentions or motivations occurs. (See also Holsti, Brody, and North's, 1968, stimulus-response models.) Like Janis, Halperin, and others, the work of Jervis and Cottam is consciously prescriptive, that is, both include advice and suggestions for improving policymaking.

The 1970s and 1980s saw a number of other influential studies that explored the impact of cognitive and psychological factors on foreign policymaking. These studies established the importance of such things as the motivations of leaders (Barber, 1972; Winter, 1973; Etheredge, 1978); leaders' cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Axelrod, 1976; Carbonell, 1978); leaders' cognitive style (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977); and their life experiences (Stewart, 1977). Good edited collections of the time, showing how individuals can shape foreign policy decisions, include M. Hermann (1977) and Falkowski (1979).

National and Societal Characteristics. The effects that the national attributes of a country (size, wealth, political accountability, economic system) had on foreign policy received much attention from CFP researchers interested in ascertaining if certain types of foreign policy behavior resulted from particular types of states. The propensity to be involved in war was usually the dependent variable of choice in this work (Rummel, 1972, 1977, 1979; Kean and McGowan, 1973; East and Hermann, 1974; East, 1978; Salmore and Salmore, 1978). Are large nations more likely to go to war than small nations? Are rich nations more likely to go to war than poor ones? Are authoritarian regimes more bellicose than democracies? Statistical manipulation of aggregate data uncovered few lawlike generalizations, except for the relative lack of war between democracies. (For an interesting treatment of the

multilevel causes and effects of war, see Beer, 1981.) Research on the effects of economic structures and conditions on foreign policy choice was fairly rare in this early work. The "culture" of IPE and the "culture" of FPA did not appear to mix well. The works of Neil Richardson (Richardson and Kegley, 1980) and of Peter Katzenstein (1985) are notable exceptions.

Other FPA scholars probed more deeply into the impact of particular national characteristics and institutions. The most important domestic political imperatives studied by the first generation of FPA researchers focused on probing elite and mass opinion (piggybacking onto the sophisticated voter-attitude studies being done in American politics). Although usually confined to studies of democratic nations (especially the United States, for which survey research results were abundant), these analyses investigated the limits of the so-called Almond-Lippmann consensus: that is, that public opinion lacks coherence and structure with regard to foreign policy issues and, as a result, does not have a large impact on the nation's conduct of foreign policy (Bailey, 1948; Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955; Converse, 1964; Lipset, 1966). Opinion data collected during the Vietnam War served as a catalyst to reexamine this question. Caspary (1970) and Achen (1975) found more stability in American public opinion concerning foreign policy and international involvement than their predecessors had. Mueller (1973) showed that although the public may change their opinions on international issues, they do so for rational reasons. Holsti and Rosenau (1979) and Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979) identified recognizable ideological positions to which the public subscribes on foreign policy issues. This research indicated that public and elite opinion tends to set the parameters for what government officials view as permissible actions to undertake in the foreign policy domain (Cantril, 1967; Verba et al., 1967; Graber, 1968; Verba and Brody, 1970; Hughes, 1978; Yankelovich, 1979; Beal and Hinckley, 1984).

Other scholars looked at the role of societal groups in foreign policymaking. This research built on similar work examining the effects of such groups on American domestic politics. For example, Robert Dahl's (1973) volume, *Regimes and Oppositions,* provided key theoretical concepts necessary for analyzing the relationships between domestic political pressures and foreign policy choice by the U.S. government. Those same concepts facilitated the exploration of these linkages in other countries and regions (Deutsch et al., 1967; Dallin, 1969; Hellman, 1969; Chittick, 1970; Ogata, 1977; Hughes, 1978).

Cultural factors were also studied (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965), although these types of studies were out of vogue intellectually during this period because of the excesses of the "national character research" of the 1930s. Nonetheless, these studies began the process of redressing some of the problems inherent in the previous research and once again stimulated consideration of cultural influences.

Among those first generation FPA researchers who explored the link between social context and foreign policy, Kal Holsti (1970) came closest to spanning both the psychological and the social contexts. Holsti argued that states have a "national role conception," a concept that sought to capture how a nation viewed itself and its role in the international arena. A product of the nation's socialization process, Holsti assumed that perceptions of national role were influenced by societal character. Operationally, Holsti turned to elite perceptions of national role, arguing that these perceptions were more salient to foreign policy choice. Studies by others, which anticipated Holsti's articulation of "national role conception" and which followed it, have shown that differences in role conceptions can, indeed, lead to differences in national behavior (Broderson, 1961; Hess, 1963; Merelman, 1969; Renshon, 1977; Bobrow, Chan, and Kringen, 1979).

Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday: Second Generation

The energy and creativity of the first generation of FPA research gave way almost inexorably to a period of critical evaluation that began in the late 1970s and continued until the mid-1980s. The effects of this self-assessment were felt unevenly across the three areas of FPA research; the most telling self-reflection, involving both theoretical and methodological issues, occurred in CFP.

Comparative Foreign Policy

A wide range of critiques of CFP research emerged in this second generation (Ashley, 1976, 1987; Munton, 1976; East, 1978; Kegley, 1980; Caporaso, Hermann, and Kegley, 1987; Hermann and Peacock, 1987; Smith, 1987). These evaluations, whether sympathetic or not to CFP's ambitious goals, revealed a number of inconsistencies in the approach that had to be resolved before any progress was possible. The principal stumbling blocks included the following:

- Parsimony: The tension between the desire of some CFP researchers for a hard science-like grand unified theory and the assumption that microlevel detail is necessary to explain and predict foreign policy behavior became untenable. Rosenau's "Pre-theories" article, when reviewed from this vantage point, probably set CFP up for this inevitable dilemma over parsimony. To what should we aspire: the richly detailed, comprehensively researched microanalyses of a few cases or the conceptually abstract, statistical/mathematical renderings of thousands of events? There was a desire to engage in aggregate empirical testing of cross-nationally applicable generalizations across large N-sizes, but there was also a commitment to unpacking the black box of decision making and uncovering the detail in the explanations of what was happening. CFP methods demanded parsimony in the theories that guided research; CFP theories demanded nuance and detail in the methods used.
- Quantification: A corollary of doing empirical aggregate data analysis is the need to measure and quantify the data. Indeed, quantification of variables is essential to mathematical manipulations such as differential equations, linear regression, or correlation techniques. Among the independent variables of CFP, however, are some that are difficult to operationalize and measure, such as perception, memory, emotion, culture, and history. Moreover, these variables are all placed in a dynamic and evolving stream of human action and reaction. To leave out such variables defeated the purpose of microanalysis; to leave them in by forcing what data were available into quasi-interval level measures seemed to do violence to the substance CFP sought to capture. As a result, some researchers began to ask whether their methods had become barriers, preventing them from achieving their theoretical goals.
- Policy relevance: Those involved in CFP believed that the events data sets they were creating could yield information of use to foreign policymakers. Specifically, events data could be used to set up early warning systems that would alert policymakers to emerging crises around the world. Several computerized decision aids and analysis packages were created for this purpose: EWAMS (Early Warning and Monitoring System), CASCON (Computer-aided Systems for Handling Information on Local Conflicts), CACIS (Computer-aided Conflict Information System), and XAIDS (Crisis Management Executive Decision Aids) (Andriole and Hopple, 1981). Unfortunately, these computer packages could never live up to their promise. The collected events meant nothing without a theory to explain and predict their occurrence and their

implications for future actions. Yet, the methodological strictures of CFP resulted in bivariate theoretical propositions that were, by and large, globally applicable (such as, "large nations participate more in international interactions than small nations") but vacuous for those interested in specific crisis situations (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). Again, CFP found itself being pulled in opposite directions. Was the research goal to say something predictive about a specific nation in a particular set of circumstances (which would be highly policy relevant, but which might closely resemble information from a traditional country expert)? Or was the goal a grand unified theory (which would not be very policy relevant, but which would add scientific understanding to the study of foreign policy)? Attempts to accomplish both with the same research led to products that were unsatisfactory in a scholarly as well as a policy sense.

Hindsight is always twenty/twenty. In retrospect, it does seem clear that to evolve further, CFP needed to jettison (1) the aim of a grand unified theory, and (2) the methodological straitjacket imposed by the requirements of aggregate empirical analysis. Urging those involved in CFP research to come down from the rarefied air of grand theory and to capture more of the particular, Charles Kegley (1980:12, 19) commented:

> To succeed partially is not to fail completely. . . . Goals [should be] downgraded to better fit capacities. . . . This prescribes reduction in the level of generality sought, so that more contextually-qualified, circumstantially-bounded, and temporally/spatially-specified propositions are tested. More of the peculiar, unique, and particular can be captured at a reduced level of abstraction and generality.

To be fair, the middle-range theory advocated by Kegley was Rosenau's original aim, but the CFP research community had to reach consensus to return to its founding vision. The conference on New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, held at The Ohio State University in May 1985, represented a finalization of these changes for the CFP group. (See the resulting volume, Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, 1987; see also Gerner, 1992.) The directions chosen at this meeting have, in fact, given rise to a renewed interest and research in this stream of FPA.

Foreign Policy Decision Making

In the study of foreign policy decision making, the issues were not theoretical but methodological. Nonetheless, they posed problems for researchers doing what they wanted to do. The information required to conduct a high-quality group or bureaucratic analysis of a foreign policy choice is formidable. If the researcher is not part of the group or bureaucracy in question, detailed accounts of what transpired, preferably from a variety of primary sources and viewpoints, are necessary. Because of security considerations, such information is usually not available for many years (when it is declassified or the archives are opened to historians). The question facing scholars became: Is it possible to be theoretically and policy relevant if one is relegated to doing case studies of events twenty or more years old? If so, how? If not, how can we maneuver around these data requirements to say something meaningful about more recent events? (For a discussion of these issues, see Anderson, 1987.) Researchers wrestling with this issue came up with two basic responses: (1) seek patterns in group/bureaucratic processes that can be isolated across a set of historical case studies, on the basis of which one can make both general predictions and general recommendations for present day foreign policy decision

making (Korany and Dessouki, 1984; Posen, 1984; Korany, 1986), and (2) develop innovative at-a-distance indicators of present-day group/bureaucracy processes that allow for more current explanations/predictions of foreign policy choices. (The first such indicators can be seen in the contemporary work of Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989; and Purkitt, 1992.)

Foreign Policy Context

In research on the context in which foreign policy decisions are made, work at the psychological level expanded while work at the societal level contracted. The reason for this bifurcation was again methodological. Psychology provided ready-made and effective tools for the study of political psychology; similar tools were not available for the study of political sociology. Understanding how the broader sociocultural-political context within a state contributes to its governmental policy-making (whether domestic or foreign) is, perforce, the domain of comparative politics. The theories and methods in comparative politics, however, are not as highly developed as those in psychology. The attempt to graft "scientific" statistical analyses of variance onto a theory of comparative politics was a failure. More successful were efforts to take existing comparative politics research on a particular nation and integrate these factors into explanations of that nation's foreign policy—for example, borrowing techniques from American politics (such as public opinion surveys) to study domestic political imperatives in the United States on foreign policy issues. Still missing, though, were the conceptual and methodological tools necessary to push past the artificial barrier between comparative politics and international relations that stymied theory development (Gaddis, 1992/93; Zakaria, 1992; Hudson, 1993).

Foreign Policy Analysis Today: A Hundred Flowers Bloom

As researchers involved in foreign policy analysis were working on liberating themselves from these inconsistencies, the world was being liberated from the Cold War. This coincidence was felicitous for FPA. With the great uncertainty and flux that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the actor-specific theory of FPA became more germane not only for understanding why the Cold War ended (Gaddis, 1992/93; Kegley, 1994) but also for dealing with the pressing issues, such as the growth of ethnonationalism, that rose from the embers of the Cold War.

FPA research of the last decade (1985–95) has retained the distinctive theoretical commitments that demarcated its study thirty-five years ago. Included among these are:

- a commitment to look below the state level of analysis to actor-specific information;
- a commitment to build middle-range theory at the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world;
- a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;
- a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the social sciences;
- a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision making as a subject of equal importance to the output.

Nevertheless, the sophistication of both the questions being asked and the means for answering them has grown. Indeed, FPA's ability both to raise and to address questions relevant to the post–Cold War world is greater than it has ever

been. In order to see this advance, it is useful to examine specific questions that have evolved from earlier theoretical and methodological issues and to see how specific studies have addressed them. Because the boundaries between comparative foreign policy, foreign policy decision making, and the foreign policy context are not always clear-cut, we have again listed the questions and placed specific works in the areas that seem most relevant. Importantly, FPA research has grown so large that it is impossible to survey the entire literature; as a result, this review is illustrative, not comprehensive.

Comparative Foreign Policy

It is no use raising new questions without knowing whether they can be answered. The challenge facing CFP in contemporary times is to develop innovative new methods to generate useful middle-range theory. Among the issues under consideration are:

- Can events data be reconceptualized to be of use to contemporary FPA?
- Can FPA utilize methods created to simulate human decision making to integrate complex, unquantifiable data?
- Can rational choice models be altered to accommodate actor-specific idiosyncrasies in the specification of utility, choice mechanisms, and choice constraints?
- Can models be created that will accept as inputs the actor-specific knowledge generated by country and regional experts working in the comparative politics tradition?
- When is actor-specific detail necessary, and when is actor-general theory sufficient to explain and predict foreign policy choices?
- Can discursive analysis be used to examine the dynamics of evolving understanding in foreign policy decision making?

Some of the most innovative work in FPA is being done by those wrestling with these key methodological issues. Significant breakthroughs in this area could mean increased strides in the corroboration of theory (and, thus, theory building). Witness the resurgent interest in the potential of events data. In addition to using machine coding to speed up the process (Gerner et al., 1994), could we also envision a new kind of events data? What if we thought of events data as a chronology of linked actions so researchers could trace the dynamics of action and reaction between nations? Such a chronology would include information on "low politics" transactions like trade flows as well as the more traditional "high politics" interchanges involving treaties and hostilities (Schrodt, 1995).

Computational modeling is another methodological innovation that is being explored for its use in the simulation of human reasoning. If one theorizes about the role of reasoning, problem representation, learning, memory, discourse, or analogy in foreign policymaking, how could the researcher test the resulting theoretical framework? One approach is to harness the reasoning power of a computer, that can be programmed to function as an analog to a human reasoner. A computer, like a human, is able to integrate and synthesize a vast amount of information, most of which is unquantifiable, and apply rules of judgment to this information in order to produce a choice. (For an overview of the types of computational models being constructed, see Hudson, 1991a.) Computational models can also be used to analyze meaning structures within textual data, and, thus, are often employed in discursive analysis (Alker et al., 1991).

Discursive methods themselves show great promise in the development of mid-

dle-range theory. Postmodernism in international relations found a welcome home in FPA, where discursive and natural language approaches to understanding how decision makers make sense of their world have become increasingly popular. There has been an explosion of interest in the analysis of rhetoric and argument in foreign policy speeches and documents (Alker et al., 1991; Banerjee, 1991; Boynton, 1991; Mallery, 1991; Sylvan, Majeski, and Milliken, 1991). To take but one example, Sylvan, Majeski, and Milliken (1991) have used primary documents from the Vietnam period to trace the dynamics of persuasion among policymakers. The flow of memos and countermemos enabled Sylvan and his colleagues to visually represent how shared interpretations were formed across time.

With the passing of the Cold War, there has been increased interest in finding ways to include actor-specific information into theories of strategic choice. This is one of three places in which actor-general theory from IR and actor-specific theory from FPA come together today. At issue is how close an actor-general theory can come to FPA without renouncing abstract theory. However, there appear to be many scholars willing to take this risk and to search for a theoretical middle ground between parsimony and complexity (Lebow, 1981; Walt, 1987, 1992; Cioffi-Revilla, 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Boyer, 1992; Vertzberger, 1992, 1993; Kim and Bueno de Mesquita, 1993). The work of Jack Levy (1992) on prospect theory illustrates this theoretical direction. Prospect theory, which analyzes choice under risk and examines which choices are pervasive in international politics, would lead us to anticipate that loss aversion is of much higher salience to international actors than expected utility theory would predict. Loss aversion drives prudence in healthy states, but it promotes excessively risky action in deteriorating states. Because of loss aversion, the bargaining space of actors may be much more constrained than rational choice or deterrence models predict.

The idea that FPA theories should be able to incorporate the insights and information of country and regional experts is not new. What is new is the desire and the ability to do so over multiple levels of analysis simultaneously. Two pieces of research suggest what is being tried. Each took a framework that examines a different aspect of foreign policymaking—one focused on the nature of the decision unit and its influence on the decision (Hagan, Hermann, and Hermann, 1990), the other examined how governments respond to domestic political competition using foreign policy (Hudson, Sims, and Thomas, 1993). Both studies then asked country experts to apply their respective framework to a particular case. These researchers recognized the importance of country expertise in providing the detailed insights necessary to determine if their frameworks have validity cross-nationally. The frameworks guide the case analysis, but they can, in turn, be modified based on what is learned from investigating a series of cases. Thus, traditional and behavioral approaches coexist and strengthen one another in the process.

Foreign Policy Decision Making

The first two generations of research in foreign policy decision making were devoted to establishing the legitimacy of focusing on group decision-making structures and processes, and of developing theoretical perspectives to explain typical patterns of small and large group behavior observed in the real world. The third generation of research has begun to unpack the cognitive tasks that groups engage in, asking such questions as:

- How are problems recognized as such by the group?
- How are situations "framed" and "represented"?

- How are options developed?
- How does a group come to share an interpretation of the situation?
- How does a group change an established interpretation?
- How does a group innovate and learn?
- How does group memory affect group action?
- How do various leader personality types shape the structure and process of groups serving them?
- How are group structure and process a function of societal culture?

How do foreign policy decision makers respond to change and uncertainty in their environments? Understanding the roots of this response allows analysis of innovation and learning. Research that has begun to lay the foundations for answering this question is reported in Bill (1990), Breslauer and Tetlock (1991), and Voss et al. (1991). Closely related to the study of creativity and learning is research into problem representation in foreign policy, which asks how a foreign policy problem becomes "framed," that is, understood in the existing context of beliefs and values. If this initial "framing" were understood, those working in this area (Beasley, 1994; Billings and Hermann, 1994; Breuning, 1994; Purkitt, 1994; Young, 1994) argue that we would have sufficient information to construct the decision maker's response to the problem. To take one example of this literature, Yuen Foon Khong tackles problem representation from the perspective of analogical discourse. Khong's *Analogies at War* (1992) demonstrates how the use of conflicting analogies to frame the problem of Vietnam led to conceptual difficulties in reasoning about policy options. The "Korea" analogy gained ascendance in framing the Vietnam problem without enough attention paid to the incongruities between the two sets of circumstances.

That such new questions are being asked does not mean that research on the classic questions of foreign policy decision making has ceased. The continued exploration of how different group structures and norms may lead to different group processes, which in turn may lead to different foreign policy decisions, remains a mainstay of this tradition (Dyson and Purkitt, 1986; Kaplan and Miller, 1987; Thompson, Mannix, and Bazerman, 1988; Gaenslen, 1992; Orbovich and Molnar, 1992; Purkitt, 1992). Of special interest has been the revisitation, critique, and refinement of Janis' concept of groupthink (Herek, Janis, and Huth, 1987; McCauley, 1989; Ripley, 1989; 't Hart, 1990; Gaenslen, 1992). Richly detailed case studies making use of declassified U.S. documents and tape transcripts (Purkitt, 1992), or researched with the active assistance of a country expert (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989), have altered the way we look at group decision making. Purkitt (1992), for instance, is able to show that closure on options is a much more tentative and fluid process than previously understood. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, options that had earlier been "ruled out" resurfaced again—even toward the very end of the crisis.

The effects of organizational and bureaucratic forces on foreign policy decision making also continue to be examined. The high data requirements virtually guarantee that the research must be conducted by FPA scholars who are also country experts. Not surprisingly, many analyses of organizations and bureaucracies in foreign policy gravitate toward the military establishment. Exemplars in the U.S. national security field include Hilsman (1987), Kozak and Keagle (1988), and Wiarda (1990). Barry Posen (1984) has demonstrated how military doctrine in Britain, France, and Germany was shaped by organizational imperatives and aspirations in the interwar period. Kimberly Zisk (1993) has shown the same for the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1971. There is also a developing literature on organizational and bureaucratic analysis of less developed countries (Korany, 1986; Korany and Dessouki, 1984; Vertzberger, 1984; Korany, 1986).

Foreign Policy Context

In terms of the sheer volume of research, the main theoretical thrust in the study of the foreign policy context revolves around determining the conditions under which either actor-general or actor-specific theory may profitably be used. This determination boils down to answering the question: When does context matter? In particular, five aspects of the psychosocial context of foreign policy have been the focus of substantial research:

- individual characteristics;
- perceptions;
- society and culture;
- the polity;
- the international system.

Individual difference studies remain an active area of research. Studies have focused on the development of the conditions when individual differences count (for example, Hermann, 1993) and how certain leader types are likely to shape their advisory groups (for example, Hermann and Preston, 1994). A recent innovation has been the explicit comparison of different explanatory frameworks by applying them to understanding the same leader, allowing for inspection of the frameworks' relative strengths and weaknesses (see, for example, Winter et al., 1991; Singer and Hudson, 1992; Snare, 1992). Change in leaders' attributes and attitudes is a relatively new avenue of research: for example, an intriguing series of studies by Deborah Welch Larson (1985, 1988) detail the shifts in attitudes of leaders at the end of World War II that resulted in the Cold War.

Analysis of perceptions and images, especially as they are related to war and deterrence, also continues to be an active area of research, but its central questions are evolving to reflect the need to discover the conditions that specify when perceptions are important to know and when they are not. The study of perceptions and their impact on decision making in threat and deterrence situations became a particular focus of attention in the last days of the Cold War (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; George and Smoke, 1989; Holsti, 1989; Breslauer, 1990; Lebow and Stein, 1990). Some researchers have moved to specify how perceptions become linked to form images and to develop image theory (Cottam, 1986; Herrmann, 1993, 1986, 1985; Larson, 1993; Walt, 1992). Herrmann (1993), for example, developed a typology of stereotypical images with reference to Soviet perceptions (the other as "child," as "degenerate," as "enemy," etc.), and has begun to extend his analysis to contemporary Russian, Islamic, and American images. (See also Cottam, 1977.) This research on perceptions and images has caught the attention of those in IR who are modelling strategic choice. As noted above, such models appear to require actor-specific information to be accurate in their forecasts of outcomes.

One type of image theory, which is concerned with national role conceptions, has begun to take on a new importance and energy. There was little work on national role conceptions for some time after K. Holsti's 1970 work. Stephen Walker (1987) and Naomi Wish (1980) kept role theory alive until a younger generation (Breuning, 1992; Cottam and Shih, 1992; Seeger, 1992; Shih, 1993) began to explore its usefulness. Why the new interest in role conceptions? National role conception is one of the few conceptual tools we have for the study of how society and culture serve as a context for a nation's foreign policy. It allows one to bridge the conceptual gap between the general beliefs held in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy decision makers. For example, Breuning (1995) has been

able to show that the foreign policy differences between two arguably similar states, Belgium and the Netherlands, are due to major differences in historical experience that have indelibly stamped each nation's conception of the role it plays in international relations to this day.

Why not then go directly to studying cultural influences on foreign policy? The examination of how cultural and social differences shape decision making is just beginning to blossom (Pye, 1986; Sampson, 1987). Notions of understanding and causality may be different for different cultures (Motokawa, 1989), as are techniques for resolving conflict (Cushman and King, 1985; Gaenslen, 1989). The structures and processes of policymaking also appear to be affected by cultural and societal norms (Holland, 1984; Lampton, 1986; Leung, 1987). As a result, there has been renewed interest in the topic of comparative political socialization and political learning (Etheredge, 1985; Merelman, 1986; Voss and Dorsey, 1992; Hudson, 1995).

What happens when we take into consideration the nature of the polity, or political system, in examining how foreign policy is made? How do domestic political imperatives and constraints affect national foreign policy? Putnam (1988) has proposed that foreign policymaking is a "two-level game." A nation's leaders simultaneously play an international game and a domestic game with every move they make in foreign policy. In effect, the leader can strategically use developments at one level to affect choices made at the other. Thus, domestic electoral politics may actually give the leader more, rather than less, leverage in international negotiations. Hagan (1987), Levy (1988), Levy and Vakili (1989), Lamborn and Mumme (1989), Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989), Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam (1993), Müller and Risse-Kappen (1993), and Skidmore and Hudson (1993) have helped to delimit the conditions under which societal (and transnational) groups are more or less influential, the methodology by which one may trace the influence of these groups on the foreign policy decisions of a government, and the nexus between regime type and regime response to societal group activity.

Two other identifiable research areas have each taken a unique slant on whether broad differences in polity type lead to discernible differences in nation-state foreign policy. The first has focused on the relationship between political systems and war, seeking to understand why democracies do not, as a rule, fight one another. The second has examined how changes in national regimes affect foreign policy.

Every once in a while a research question will focus the attention of scholars from disparate areas of inquiry, uniting them in the quest for an answer. The "democratic peace" (Russett, 1993a, 1993b) is such a question. Why don't democracies fight one another? Here we find more abstract theorists of war (Dixon, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Morgan, 1993; Ray, 1993; Russett, 1993a, 1993b) wrestling with a question that leads them into FPA waters and into conversation with FPA scholars (Mintz and Geva, 1993; Hagan, 1994; Hermann and Kegley, 1995). The result of such discussion is illustrated in the work of Alex Mintz and his colleagues (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz, 1993), who have proposed that democracies are less likely to fight each other because such regimes are not politically compensated domestically for bellicose behavior toward one another. Indeed, the leadership's policies can be viewed as failures if they involve confronting another democracy.

The question of how regime change affects foreign policy has not quite caught on in the same way as the debate over democracies and war. Nevertheless, there is a small but persistent research effort in this area. The innovative conceptual work of Joe Hagan (1987, 1993) deserves particular note. Hagan has compiled a large database on the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special

reference to executive and legislative structures. His purpose is to explore the effects of political opposition on foreign policy choice. Using aggregate statistical analysis, he is able to show, for example, that the internal fragmentation of a regime has substantially less effect on foreign policy behavior than military or party opposition to the regime. Hagan's data set allows him to study this question in an aggregate manner (Hagan, 1995); other researchers are employing a more country-specific case study approach (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson, 1995).

The end of the Cold War allows FPA scholars to ask how drastic international system change affects what states do in their foreign policy. After all, the system itself is part of the context of decision making. This question has the potential to be integrative: arguably, the effects of system change on a particular state's foreign policy will be mediated by a whole host of factors at various levels of analysis in FPA. Although there have been several attempts to explore the nature of this integration (Hermann, 1990; Rosati, 1994), descriptive work on this issue has yet to yield any noteworthy advancements.

Foreign Policy Analysis Tomorrow: The Bridge Across

This detailed survey of the past and present of FPA allows us to pose three questions. Where is FPA headed? What role might FPA play in the future? What role should it play?

We see FPA as a bridging field linking international relations theory, comparative politics, and the foreign policymaking community. We have already seen evidence that such a bridging process is under way between international relations theory and FPA in at least three areas: (1) the analysis of strategic choice; (2) modelling the two-level game; and (3) explaining the democratic peace. In each case, the role of the FPA scholars has been to begin to specify some of the limiting or scope conditions for the actor-general theory being developed in international relations.

Mutually beneficial interaction is also taking place between FPA and scholars in comparative politics. We are encouraged by the recent efforts to involve country and regional experts in explicating, testing, and refining theories of foreign policy decision making. Foreign policy analysts have also begun to develop country and regional expertise for purposes of obtaining an empirical grounding for their theories. Such knowledge is particularly important because distinctions between foreign and domestic policy have blurred to the point that political science appears to require nothing less than an overall theory of human political choice. FPA theories seem to apply as much to the explanation and projection of *domestic* policy choice as to *foreign* policy choice. Personal characteristics of leaders, discourse, problem representation, creativity and learning, advisory processes, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics, societal groups, domestic political imperatives, and so on are as relevant to country and regional experts as to FPA analysts.

FPA, with its focus on actor-specific theory, also has potential to "bridge the gap" between the worlds of academia and policymaking. As George (1993:9) has observed:

> Practitioners find it difficult to make use of academic approaches such as structural realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to work with actor-specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patterns of each state and leader with which they must deal.

Neither raw theory nor raw detail is readily digestible by those who must respond daily to threatening foreign policy situations. FPA's interweaving of theory with detail can help build the environment that George envisions. To this end, the FPA community can contribute most concretely to the creation of such an environment by pursuing the following goals:

- The delineation of scope conditions. When will actor-general theory suffice? When must actor-specific theory be employed? Some such scope conditions immediately spring to mind from the overview of FPA presented in this article. For example, actor-specific theory is critical when there are serious disagreements within the government about the best foreign policy choice to make (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989). Moreover, specific theory is important when there is an idiosyncratic, culturally shared conception of what is good foreign policy (Breuning, 1995). Without delineating scope conditions, the bridging role will prove more difficult.
- The development of dynamic theory. FPA needs to move from the theoretical equivalent of photos to that of motion pictures. How do perceptions change and evolve? How are events seen as part of larger sequences of meaningful interaction between nations? Unless theories can capture the "motion" in international relations, they will have clipped wings—pretty to look at, but fairly useless in application.
- The integration of knowledge across multiple levels of analysis. Avowedly integrative studies are few and far between in the present generation of FPA work. Why is this so? Integration must return as a priority in FPA, and scholars working at a particular level of analysis should consider how to incorporate findings from other levels.
- The refinement of the dependent variable: foreign policy. Foreign policy as a dependent variable has never been as nuanced as the independent variables used to explain it. In one sense, the dependent variable is overdetermined: there is more possible variation in the independent variables than is possible in the dependent variable. Can we incorporate into the conception of foreign policy enough detail and meaning to warrant the level of specifics demanded by FPA theory? Reconsiderations of events data (Merritt, Muncaster, and Zinnes, 1993; Schrodt, 1995) and the development of discursive analysis and computational modeling may assist in this effort (Hudson, 1991b).
- Attention to becoming more policy relevant. Policy relevance will flow naturally from accomplishment of the previous goals. Nevertheless, as we choose our topics and our methods in FPA, we should be alert for opportunities to address complex current issues of real concern to policymakers.

The actor-specific theory produced through foreign policy analysis has enormous theoretical, methodological, and policy potential: a potential that is only starting to be recognized as researchers work to develop theories that facilitate our understanding of why certain foreign policy decisions are made, at particular points in time, by individual decision makers and collectivities of decision makers.

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