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Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders

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Do the personal characteristics of political leaders affect their governments' foreign policy behavior? The present study examines the impact of 6 personal characteristics of 45 heads of government on the foreign policy behavior of their nations. These characteristics, each of individual interest, interrelate to form two orientations to foreign affairs, and the influence of these orientations on foreign policy behavior is also explored. The results are reported for all 45 heads of government, as well as for those leaders among the 45 with high or low interest in foreign affairs and with little or much training in foreign affairs.

Introduction

Parties to the continuing debate concerning whether the personal characteristics of political leaders can affect policy have increasingly turned to empirical research to seek resolution to the controversy. Many of the resulting studies have focused on foreign policy (e.g., Crow and Noel, 1977; Driver, 1977; Falkowski, 1978; Hermann, 1974, 1977; Winter and Stewart, 1977). Emerging from this research are portraits of national political

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leaders who influence their governments toward aggressive or toward conciliatory relations with other nations. The data suggest that aggressive leaders are high in need for power, low in conceptual complexity, distrustful of others, nationalistic, and likely to believe that they have some control over the events in which they are involved. In contrast, the data suggest that conciliatory leaders are high in need for affiliation, high in conceptual complexity, trusting of others, low in nationalism, and likely to exhibit little belief in their own ability to control the events in which they are involved.

The present article has as its purpose a further examination of how these 6 personal characteristics relate to foreign policy behavior for some 45 heads of government. The study is unique in several ways. (1) To date, researchers have not examined all 6 characteristics in the same study. (2) A conceptual scheme is presented to link these characteristics to foreign policy behavior. (3) An attempt is made to broaden the foreign policy behaviors that are examined beyond specifically aggressive (i.e., entry into war, arms increases) and conciliatory (i.e., entry into international agreements) behaviors.

Conceptual Scheme[1]

The six personal characteristics we are examining in this research were selected because they have been found to relate to foreign policy behavior in several studies. The characteristics represent four broad types of personal characteristics that journalists and scholars alike suggest have an impact on the content as well as the means of making political decisions. These four types of personal characteristics are beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style.

Beliefs refer to a political leader's fundamental assumptions about the world. Are events predictable, is conflict basic to human interaction, can one have some control over events, is the

1. The conceptual scheme sketched here appears in a more detailed form in Hermann (1978).

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maintenance of national sovereignty and superiority the most important objective of a nation? Answers to questions such as these suggest some of a political leader's beliefs. Beliefs are proposed by many (e.g., Axelrod, 1976; DeRivera, 1968; Frank, 1968; Holsti, 1967; Jervis, 1976; Verba, 1969) to affect a political leader's interpretation of his environment and, in turn, the strategies that the leader employs. Two of the personal characteristics examined in the present study fall under the category of beliefs—nationalism and belief in one's own ability to control events. Nationalism is often used by journalists and policy makers as a reason for a specific political leader's actions, particularly in discussions of leaders of Third World countries. Ascertaining a political leader's belief in the controllability of events is thought to be fundamental in developing his/her operational code—the way a political leader defines the basic rules that govern political behavior (see George, 1969; Holsti, 1977).

It is hard to find journalistic political analysis that does not consider at some point the reasons why a political leader is doing what he/she is doing—in effect, the political leader's motives. Need for power is probably the most discussed motive with reference to political leaders. But others, such as need for affiliation and need for approval, also appear regularly in such writings. Motives appear to affect political leaders' interpretations of their environment and the strategies they use (see Barber, 1965; Hermann, 1977, 1978). In the present research we will look at need for power and need for affiliation. Winter and Stewart (1977) found these two needs particularly important in their examination of the motives of twentieth-century presidents. These two motives appeared to influence the type of foreign behavior the presidents urged on their governments.

By decision style is meant preferred methods of making decisions. How does the political leader go about making decisions? Are there certain ways of approaching a policy-making task which characterize the leader? Possible components of decision style are openness to new information, preference for certain levels of risk, complexity in structuring and processing information, and ability to tolerate ambiguity. Decision style is quite

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similar to what is referred to in operational code studies as instrumental beliefs—preferred styles and strategies for political behavior (see George, 1969; Holsti, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Thordarson, 1972). Moreover, much of what Barber (1972) discusses in examining presidential character deals with decision style. His four basic character patterns carry with them distinctive decision styles. Conceptual complexity or complexity in structuring and processing information is the decision style examined in the present study. Driver (1977) reports that, in his research, differences in leaders' conceptual complexity influenced how aggressive the leaders' governments were in their foreign policy activity.

The last type of personal characteristic—interpersonal style—deals with the characteristic ways in which a policy maker deals with other policy makers. Two interpersonal style characteristics —paranoia (excessive suspiciousness) and Machiavellianism (unscrupulous, manipulative behavior)—are often noted as particularly pronounced in political leaders (see Christie and Geis, 1970; Guterman, 1970; Hofstadter, 1965; Rutherford, 1966). Tucker (1965) has proposed that these two traits are related in a type of political leader having a "warfare personality," for example, Stalin and Hitler. The political behavior of such a leader is combative in nature. Suspiciousness or distrust of others is the interpersonal style variable examined in the present research.

These four types of personal characteristics are expected to affect both the style and content of foreign policy. Because beliefs and motives suggest ways of interpreting the environment, political leaders are likely to urge their governments to act in ways consistent with such images. Specifically, political leaders' beliefs and motives provide them with a map for charting their course. As George (1969) notes:

> (1) The political actor's information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) his knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the consequences of choosing one or another course of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is 'best' [1969: 197].

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Some kind of map is needed. The political leader's cognitive map provides ways to overcome the conditions George describes; it suggests the appropriate steps to one's goal and, at times, the nature of the goal.

With regard to decision style and interpersonal style, we make an assumption that a political leader will generally engage in similar stylistic behavior regardless of arena. Thus, political leaders' preferred methods of making personal decisions and interacting with others will carry over to their political behavior. Style is probably one of the first differences, for example, noted when heads of government change as the new leader tries to make himself comfortable in his role. One head of state may focus foreign policy-making within his own office, while his predecessor may have been willing to let the bureaucracy handle all but problems of crisis proportions. One head of state may be given to rhetoric in the foreign policy arena; his predecessor may have wanted action. Moreover, the bureaucracy tends to adjust to changes in style from one chief executive to the next hoping to minimize differences between itself and the chief executive. The result may be to accentuate the stylistic predilections of high level decision makers. In turn, the policy begins to reflect the stylistic preferences of these high level policy makers.

Given this description of the types of personal characteristics that will affect foreign policy and how they will affect it, what kinds of foreign policy would we expect from political leaders with the six characteristics under study here? In addition to aggressive and conciliatory behavior, what foreign policy behaviors will such leaders urge that their governments consider? If we examine the dynamics of the traits associated with the aggressive leader, we find a need to manipulate and control others, little ability to consider a range of alternatives, suspiciousness of others' motives, a high interest in maintaining national identity and sovereignty, and a distinct willingness to initiate action. Extrapolating from these dynamics to foreign policy behavior, the characteristics are suggestive of a foreign policy which is independent in style and content. Such leaders will seek to maintain their nation's individuality, to keep their nations

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as much as possible apart from the other nations in the international system, since extensive contact with other nations may lead to dependence on these nations. They will urge their governments to be suspicious of the motives of leaders of other nations. When interaction is necessary, they expect it to be on their nations' terms.

Contrast the personal dynamics for the aggressive leader with those for the leader who has been found to be generally conciliatory. The personal characteristics of the conciliatory leader indicate a need to establish and maintain friendly relationships with others, an ability to consider a wide range of alternatives, little suspiciousness of others' motives, no overriding concern with the maintenance of national identity and sovereignty, and little interest in initiating action. These dynamics suggest a more participatory foreign policy. Such leaders are likely to be interested in having their nations interact with other nations, in learning what other nations have of value for their nation and find valuable about their nation, and in seeking a wide range of alternative solutions to problems jointly plaguing their nation and other nations. They will probably keep attuned to what is going on in international relations, being sensitive and responsive to this environment. In effect, these leaders will attempt to facilitate their nations' participation in the international system.

What we are suggesting by this discussion is that the personal characteristics under study interrelate to form a personal orientation to behavior or a general way of responding to one's environment. This personal orientation is transformed by the head of government into a general orientation to foreign affairs. By knowing a head of government's orientation to foreign affairs, one knows his predispositions when faced with a foreign policy-making task—how he will define the situation and the style of behavior he will be likely to emphasize. Heads of government with the personal characteristics in the present study are thought to be predisposed toward either an independent or participatory orientation to foreign affairs depending on how the characteristics interrelate. Traits that have characterized the aggressive political leader in previous research are expected to interrelate

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to form an independent orientation to foreign affairs and to lead to foreign policy behaviors which emphasize an independent foreign policy in style and content. On the other hand, traits that have characterized the conciliatory political leader in previous research are expected to interrelate to form a participatory orientation to foreign affairs and to lead to foreign policy behaviors which emphasize participation with other governments in style and content.

As the writer has proposed elsewhere (Hermann, 1976, 1978, 1979; Hermann and Hermann, 1979), the personal characteristics and orientations of heads of government examined in this research are likely to have more impact on a government's foreign policy under some circumstances than under others. We will explore two such conditions in this study—one that is hypothesized to enhance the effect of leader personality on foreign policy behavior and one that is thought to diminish such effects. The two variables we will study here are interest in foreign affairs and training in foreign affairs. Interest in foreign affairs will enhance the effect of a political leader's characteristics on government policy, whereas training in foreign affairs will diminish such an effect.

Interest in foreign affairs acts as a motivating force. An important consequence of interest in foreign policy will be increased participation in the making of foreign policy. The head of government will want to be consulted on decisions and to be kept informed about what is happening in foreign affairs. Moreover, the reasons behind a head of government's interest in foreign policy—he places value on good external relations, he fears an enemy takeover, he sees it as a way of gaining re-election—may predetermine the course of action he will seek to implement. With little interest in foreign affairs, the head of government is likely to delegate authority to other people, negating the effect of his personality on the resultant policy except as his spokesman's personality is similar to his own.

With regard to training in foreign affairs, the head of government with little or no training has no expertise on which to call. He has no previous experience to suggest possible alternatives

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or plans of action. As a result, his natural predispositions come into play. The head of government with training, on the other hand, has some knowledge about what will succeed and fail in the international arena. As a consequence of his experience, he has very likely developed certain styles and strategies for dealing with a foreign policy situation that are particular to the issue and/or target nation involved. There is less dependence on his underlying predispositions.

Measurement of Personal Characteristics

PROCEDURE AND SUBJECTS

Content analysis was used to assess the personal characteristics of the heads of government who were the subjects of this research. Content analysis has proven useful in measuring the personal characteristics of political leaders like heads of government who are virtually inaccessible for personality testing or clinical interviewing (see Eckhardt and White, 1967; Hermann, 1974, 1977; Shneidman, 1963; Winter and Stewart, 1977). The material which was content analyzed consisted of responses by heads of government to reporters' questions, generally in a press conference setting. The U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) *Daily Report* (a document containing verbatim transcripts of material gleaned from U.S. monitoring of foreign broadcasts) and the New York *Times* were the basic sources used in collecting the interview responses.[2]

Press interviews with heads of government were used because they appear to contain the most spontaneous *public* material available on such political leaders. Spontaneous material is desirable because it minimizes the effects of "ghost writing" and planned communication. Materials such as speeches and letters

2. These two sources were supplemented by material from "Meet the Press" and "Face the Nation" television interview shows when such were available. Material on the U.S. presidents was taken from the *Public Papers of the Presidents*. The *Public Papers of the Presidents* includes verbatim transcripts of all press conferences held during a president's tenure.

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are often written for the head of government by others and are generally designed to convey a specific image to a certain audience. As a consequence, the researcher content analyzing these materials will learn what the ghost writer is like or what the image is which the political leader would like to reflect. In the press conference setting, the head of government is usually the author of his responses and often has little time in which to plan his response. Several content analysis studies (e.g., LeVine, 1966; Osgood and Anderson, 1957) suggest that the link between personal characteristics and spontaneous material is stronger than that between personal characteristics and planned material.

The FBIS *Daily Report* and New York *Times* were searched for material on 80 heads of government who held office during the decade 1959-1968 in the 38 nations comprising the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project sample. At least 15 verbatim interview responses across a head of government's period in office were found for 45 (56%) of the heads of government. These 45 heads of government are the subjects of the present study and are listed in Table 1 by country. Table 1 also indicates for each head of government the years during the 1959-1968 decade in which he/she held office, the number of verbatim interview responses that were content analyzed, the average number of words in an interview response, the number of interviews included in the interview responses, and the number of different years covered in the interviews and interview responses. To be included in the sample, the head of government had to have interview responses at more than one point in time during his/her tenure in office. For most of the heads of government listed, the interview responses analyzed represent the total number of verbatim responses available for that individual in the FBIS *Daily Report* and New York *Times* during his/her years in office. Only for the three U.S. presidents were we forced to move to a sampling procedure because of the amount of material available for them. Every fifth interview response was included in the content analysis for each of the U.S. presidents.

The following process was used in doing the content analysis. All the interview responses to be content analyzed were put into

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TABLE 1

Nature of Sample and Material Used in Content Analysis

Nation and Head of State	*Years in Office During Decade 1959-68*	*Number of Interview Responses Analyzed*	*Average Number of Words Per Response*	*Number of Interviews*	*Number of Years Interviews Cover*
Canada:					
Diefenbaker	1959-4/1963	37	94	16	5
Pearson	4/1963-4/1968	22	36	17	6
Trudeau	4/1968-12/1968	47	65	17	3
Chile:					
Frei	11/1964-1968	27	139	8	5
China:					
Chou En-Lai	1959-8/1966	25	192	6	4
Lin Piao	8/1966-1968	19	77	8	3
Costa Rica:					
Orlich	5/1962-5/1966	24	80	8	4
Cuba:					
Castro	1959-1968	49	251	8	4
East Germany:					
Ulbricht	1959-1968	30	213	5	2
Egypt:					
Nasser	1959-1968	76	46	25	9
France:					
DeGaulle	1959-1968	31	260	7	5
Ghana:					
Nkrumah	1959-2/1966	17	189	3	3
Guinea:					
Toure	1959-1968	22	182	10	6

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TABLE 1 (Continued)

Nation and Head of State	*Years in Office During Decade 1959-68*	*Number of Interview Responses Analyzed*	*Average Number of Words Per Response*	*Number of Interviews*	*Number of Years Interviews Cover*
India:					
Nehru	1959-5/1964	94	58	17	7
Gandhi	1966-1968	43	117	8	3
Israel:					
Ben-Gurion	1959-6/1963	73	65	23	4
Eshkol	6/1963-1968	28	174	6	3
Ivory Coast:					
Houphouet-Boigny	1960-1968	21	72	6	4
Japan:					
Kishi	1959-7/1960	21	44	7	2
Ikeda	7/1960-11/1964	21	124	8	3
Sato	11/1964-1968	22	125	5	4
Kenya:					
Kenyatta	12/1963-1968	21	80	13	5
Mexico:					
Mateos	1959-11/1964	27	60	11	4
New Zealand:					
Holyoake	12/1960-1968	15	32	11	5
Philippines:					
Garcia	1959-12/1961	28	60	11	3
Macapagal	12/1961-12/1965	26	34	17	4
Marcos	12/1965-1968	37	32	18	3
Soviet Union:					
Khruschev	1959-10/1964	77	218	11	3
Kosygin	10/1964-1968	32	190	6	3

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TABLE 1 (Continued)

Nation and Head of State	*Years in Office During Decade 1959-68*	*Number of Interview Responses Analyzed*	*Average Number of Words Per Response*	*Number of Interviews*	*Number of Years Interviews Cover*
Spain:					
Franco	1959-1968	34	57	14	7
Thailand:					
Kittikachorn	12/1963-1968	15	62	6	5
Tunisia:					
Bourguiba	1959-1968	37	179	10	2
Turkey:					
Gursel	5/1960-10/1961	23	30	13	2
Inonu	11/1961-2/1965	15	80	3	2
Demirel	10/1965-1968	24	51	8	4
Uganda:					
Obote	10/1963-1968	20	63	7	4
United States:					
Eisenhower	1959-1/1961	96	120	48	3
Kennedy	1/1961-11/1963	127	89	63	3
Johnson	11/1963-1968	79	77	39	5
Venezuela:					
Betancourt	2/1959-11/1964	39	89	16	5
West Germany:					
Adenauer	1959-10/1963	93	112	24	5
Erhard	10/1963-10/1966	43	126	11	4
Kiesinger	11/1966-1968	34	142	6	1
Yugoslavia:					
Tito	1959-1968	64	182	13	6
Zambia:					
Kaunda	10/1964-1968	46	32	23	5

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machine readable form. The cards for each leader were then run through the Key Word in Context (KWIC) Concordance program, which reports the frequency of occurrence of each word and reproduces each word in alphabetical order with the six to eight words coming before and after it (the word's context). The coding categories for the personal characteristics were designed for use with the Concordance output.

CODING CATEGORIES FOR THE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Table 2 contains a conceptualization of each of the six personal characteristics examined in this study. In addition, Table 2 presents a brief description of the coding schemes used in the content analysis for the characteristics and the scores that were employed in relating the characteristics to foreign policy behavior. Detailed coding manuals for the characteristics are available from the author. Table 2 also reports two types of reliability figures—inter-coder reliability and trait reliability.

Inter-coder reliability refers to agreement among the coders on the coding of the interview responses for the various personal characteristics. To determine inter-coder reliability, the interview responses for three of the leaders were scored by all four coders involved in the content analysis.[3] The figures listed in Table 2 indicate the average percentage of agreement among the coders. Trait reliability refers to the stability of the personal characteristic across time and issues. This reliability was calculated by dividing the interview responses for each head of government on each personal characteristic into odd and even responses. Scores for these odd and even responses were then intercorrelated across heads of government for each characteristic. These correlations, corrected for length by the Spearman-Brown formula, are the trait reliabilities listed in Table 2. The higher the correlation between scores for odd and even interview responses, the more stable the characteristic appears to be across time and issues for these heads of government.

3. The author would like to express her appreciation to Petra Donofrio, Danny Donofrio, Joanne Farley, and Beverly Gatliff for their aid with the content analysis.

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TABLE 2

Conceptualizations, Operationalizations, Scores Used, Inter-Code Agreement, and Trait Reliabilities for Personal Characteristics

Personal Characteristic	*Conceptualization*	*Operationalization*	*Score Used in Analysis*	*Inter-Coder Agreement*	*Trait Reliability*
Nationalism	View of the world in which one's own nation holds center stage; strong emotional ties to one's own nation with emphasis on national honor and national identity.	Focus on nouns/noun phrases referring to nation; coded nationalism if noun refers to own nation and is modified by favorable term, term denoting strength, or phrase suggesting importance of national honor or identity; coded nationalism if noun refers to another nation and is modified by hostile term, term denoting weakness, or phrase suggesting meddlesomeness in affairs of others.	% of references to own and other nations meeting criteria	.88	.77
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events	View of the world in which individual perceives some degree of control over situations involved in; government can influence what happens in or to nation.	Focus on verbs (action words); coded for this characteristic if context of verb indicated speaker (or group speaker identifies with) accepting responsibility for initiating or planning the action.	% of verbs meeting criteria	.97	.75
Need for Power	Concern for "establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's power, i.e., one's impact, control, or influence over others" (Winter, 1973, p. 250).	Focus on verbs; coded need power if verb context met any of six conditions indicated in Winter's (1973) need power coding scheme.	% of verbs meeting six criteria	.91	.73

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TABLE 2 (Continued)

Personal Characteristic	*Conceptualization*	*Operationalization*	*Score Used in Analysis*	*Inter-Coder Agreement*	*Trait Reliability*
Need for Affiliation	Concern with "establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm and friendly relationships" with other persons or groups (Atkinson, 1958, p. 685).	Focus on verbs; coded need affiliation if verb context met any of four conditions indicated in Atkinson's (1958) need affiliation coding scheme.	% of verbs meeting four criteria	.99	.71
Conceptual Complexity	Degree of differentiation person shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things.	Looked in content for set of high complexity words (e.g., may, possibly, sometimes, tends) and set of low complexity words (e.g., always, only, without a doubt).	Ratio of high complexity words to low complexity words	.99	.90
Distrust of Others	General feeling of doubt, uneasiness, and misgiving about others; an inclination to suspect and doubt the motives and actions of others.	Focus on nouns/noun phrases referring to groups speaker does not identify with; coded for distrust if context showed indications of doubts or misgivings or suggested group going to harm speaker or group with which speaker identifies.	% of nouns meeting criteria	.95	.90

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DETERMINING ORIENTATIONS TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the conceptual scheme presented earlier, we hypothesized that the personal characteristics in Table 2 interrelate to form two orientations to foreign affairs that affect the content and style of foreign policy behavior. To test this hypothesis most directly, two composite measures were created. The first, which we call characteristic of the independent leader, consisted of being high in nationalism, high in belief in one's own ability to control events, high in need for power, low in conceptual complexity, and high in distrust of others. The second, which is characteristic of the participatory leader, consisted of being low in nationalism, low in belief in one's own ability to control events, high in need for affiliation, high in conceptual complexity, and low in distrust of others.[4] To determine these two composites, the heads of governments' scores on each of the six personal characteristics were ranked. For the independent composite, ranks for nationalism, belief in one's own ability to control events, need for power, conceptual complexity, and distrust in others were summed. For the participatory composite, ranks for nationalism, belief in one's own ability to control events, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, and distrust in others were summed. The ranks ranged from 1 for the lowest score to 45 for the highest score when a high score was indicated by the orientation rationale, and from 1 for the highest score to 45 for the lowest score when a low score was indicated by the orientation rationale. Thus, scores for both the independent and participatory composites could run from 5 to 225.

4. The reader will note that although we are examining six personal characteristics, each of the orientations is composed of five characteristics. The orientations differ in motivating forces. Need for power is included in the independent orientation but not in the participatory orientation; need for affiliation is included in the participatory orientation but not in the independent orientation. It was unclear conceptually that need for affiliation was relevant to an independent orientation or that need for power was relevant to a participatory orientation; thus, both motives were not included in each orientation.

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INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Interest in foreign affairs refers to the amount of concern or attention which a head of government directs toward foreign policy-making. Is foreign policy a "passion"? Or does the head of government only become a participant in foreign policy-making on specific issues? Perhaps the head of government only deals with foreign affairs when forced to by circumstances.

Interest in foreign affairs was operationalized in this study by noting the percentage of foreign policy events in which a head of government participated while in office. Higher interest was indicated by a higher rate of participation. One of the variables in the CREON foreign policy events data set on which each event is coded notes if the head of government participated in the event or if his/her approval was probably needed for the action to take place (see Hermann et al., 1973: 102). The number of foreign policy events falling into these two categories for each head of government during his/her tenure in office formed the numerator for calculating rate of participation. Total number of foreign policy events during a head of government's term in office was the denominator. For most of the analyses in which we will examine interest, the variable will be dichotomized at the median denoting heads of government with high and low interest in foreign affairs.

TRAINING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By training in foreign affairs is meant having held some political or governmental position that would give one knowledge about foreign affairs and foreign policy-making. To determine amount of training for the heads of government in the present sample, a search was made of reference sources such as *Statesman's Year-Book* as well as autobiographies and biographies. All past political and governmental positions were noted. From this biographical record on the heads of government, the number of years each had held positions involving foreign affairs (e.g., foreign or defense minister, ambassador, in foreign or defense ministry, representative to UNESCO or the Common Market) was determined. The number of years the head of government

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had held his/her present office was also counted in the measure of training on the assumption that such a position was a good training ground in foreign affairs. A training score was calculated by finding what percentage of the years a head of government had been in politics involved positions in foreign affairs and foreign policy-making. In most analyses the measure of training was dichotomized at the median to indicate much and little training in foreign affairs.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS, ORIENTATIONS, INTEREST, AND TRAINING

Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the personal characteristics, orientations, interest, and training. The correlations in Table 3 indicate that the two orientations are significantly inversely related as would be expected from the nature of their construction. All five of the personal characteristics that were used in determining the independent orientation are significantly related to this composite measure in the directions suggested by the conceptual framework. Such is not the case for the participatory orientation. Nationalism, belief in one's own ability to control events, and distrust of others contribute more to this orientation than conceptual complexity and need for affiliation. The reason why conceptual complexity and need for affiliation make a smaller contribution may lie in the significant inverse relationship between these two personal characteristics, contrary to the conceptual framework.

Several other correlations among the personal characteristics included in the orientations are noteworthy. Nationalism, need for power, and distrust of others are all three significantly interrelated. At least for this sample of heads of government, the nationalist appears to be high in need for power and distrust of others.

According to Table 3, interest and training in foreign affairs show little relationship to one another for this sample. The significant correlations with the interest variable suggest that the

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TABLE 3

Data on Personal Characteristics, Orientations, Interest, and Training

Personal Characteristics	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*	*Intercorrelations*									
			1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*
1. Nationalism	.14	.09	–									
2. Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events	.59	.15	–.06	–								
3. Need Power	.19	.10	.54***	.01	–							
4. Need Affiliation	.07	.06	–.09	–.07	.15	–						
5. Conceptual Complexity	.67	.50	.00	–.20*	–.14	–.34***	–					
6. Distrust of Others	.15	.15	.63***	.13	.28**	–.21*	–.13	–				
7. Interest	.57	.11	.10	.01	.03	.05	–.47***	.19	–			
8. Training	.48	.25	.15	–.35***	–.04	.06	.13	.02	.06	–		
9. Independent Orientation	114.96	40.10	.51***	.38***	.59***	–.15	–.45***	.62***	.28**	.16	–	
10. Participatory Orientation	115.09	35.70	–.68***	–.47***	–.24*	.23*	.04	–.70***	–.28**	–.01	–.88***	–

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

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head of government with an independent orientation was more interested in foreign affairs than the head of government with the participatory orientation. Moreover, the more conceptually complex the leader was, the lower his interest in foreign affairs. For training, only the correlation with belief in one's own ability to control events is significant. The more highly trained the head of government was, the lower his/her belief in the ability to control events. Experience may lead to a realization of the range of variables which affect foreign policy over which one can have little control.

Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Behavior

Having suggested how the personal characteristics are expected to affect foreign policy behavior and having operationalized the personal characteristics employed in this research, let us examine how the personal characteristics do, in fact, relate to foreign policy behavior. The specific foreign policy behaviors included in this study are professed orientation to change, independence/interdependence of action, commitment, affect, and environmental feedback. A detailed discussion of the conceptualizations and operationalizations of each of these variables is found in Callahan et al. (forthcoming). The foreign policy behaviors are taken from the CREON events data set which includes 12,710 foreign policy events on 38 nations across the decade 1959-1968. For a description of this data set, see Hermann et al. (1973). In what follows, we will focus on each foreign policy behavior by itself, further explicating conceptually how the personal characteristics are expected to affect it and showing the relationships between it and the personal characteristics that were found.

PROFESSED ORIENTATION TO CHANGE

By professed orientation to change we mean a government's public posture regarding the need for change in the international

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environment. Do the policy-makers of a nation express little or no need for change in the international arena, or do they argue that short-term and/or long-term changes are in order? Professed orientation to change is measured by noting what percentage of the time goal statements are present in the foreign policy events of a nation during a head of government's tenure in office. Goal refers here to a desired future condition. If goal statements are generally absent, the policy-makers of a nation are considered as professing little or no need for change in the international environment, i.e., as affirming the status quo. If goal statements are generally present, the policy-makers of a nation are viewed as professing a need for change in the international environment.

How is professed orientation to change probably affected by the independent and participatory orientations to foreign affairs examined in the present study? In describing the independent orientation, we noted the importance of maintaining the status quo, that is, the importance of maintaining national individuality and the power base the head of government now has. Change is anathema to such leaders, since there is always the chance of losing what has already been gained in power and position. In some sense, heads of government with independent orientations are present or "now" oriented rather than future-oriented. They are concerned with the realities of day-to-day politics as opposed to future states or conditions. Moreover, independent leaders are secretive. Such leaders cannot be held to what they have not stated publicly; they maintain a certain maneuverability because their positions are not a matter of public record. Thus, heads of government with independent orientations are unlikely to urge their governments publicly to propose changes in the international arena.

On the other hand, heads of government with participatory orientations are likely publicly to advocate change in the international environment. One way for such heads of government to participate in the international arena is to make public their goals. Through such public goal statements, they can solicit support from and initiate relations with other nations. In effect,

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they signal the direction in which they are moving and their intentions to other nations through public goal statements.

Table 4 shows the interrelationships among the personal characteristics and professed orientation to change. Correlations are presented for the individual characteristics as well as for the composites (or orientations) to allow for a comparison between the characteristics individually and together. The relationships between personal characteristics and professed orientation to change are listed for the sample of heads of government as a whole and then for those heads of government within the sample who were high or low in interest in foreign affairs and who had much or little training in foreign affairs.

The correlations in Table 4 are in the predicted direction for the participatory orientation for all but heads of government with much training. For the independent orientation, the correlations are only in the predicted direction for heads of government with low interest and heads of government with little training. The correlations are significant for both orientations for heads of government with little training. For the independent orientation, the correlation for heads of government with much training is significant but in the reverse direction from that predicted. In effect, the results in Table 4 suggest support for the hypotheses for heads of government with little training in foreign affairs and the opposite of the hypotheses for heads of government with much training in foreign affairs. Training may afford the heads of government with a participatory orientation a wider variety of ways of signaling intent than the use of goal statements; it may teach the heads of government with an independent orientation ways of suggesting change that do not necessarily commit them publicly to a particular policy (e.g., by proposing the need for change in other nations than their own).

Looking at the individual characteristics, we note support for the hypotheses for nationalism, need for power, and need for affiliation under various of the interest and training conditions. For nationalism and need for power, the correlations are significant and in the predicted direction for heads of government with low interest and for heads of government with little training.

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TABLE 4

Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Professed Orientation to Change

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*	*Low Interest (N = 24)*	*High Interest (N = 21)*	*Little Training (N = 22)*	*Much Training (N = 23)*
Independent Orientation (–)[a]	.05	–.23	.04	–.39**	.36**
Participatory Orientation (+)	.18	.20	.24	.39**	–.26
Nationalism (–)	–.23*	–.35**	–.03	–.58***	.18
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (–)	.03	.03	.03	–.04	.18
Need Power (–)	–.30**	–.51***	.01	–.49***	.02
Need Affiliation (+)	.31**	.03	.69***	.26	.38**
Conceptual Complexity (+)	–.28**	–.32*	–.41**	–.03	–.51***
Distrust of Others (–)	–.15	–.08	–.23	–.35*	.15

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

a. The sign in parentheses indicates the direction of the hypothesized relationship with professed orientation to change: a + sign indicates a positive relationship; a – sign indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship.

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On the contrary, for need for affiliation, the correlations are significant and in the predicted direction for heads of government with high interest and for heads of government with much training. Conceptual complexity was related in the opposite direction from that predicted for each group of heads of government. High conceptual complexity was related to little professed need for change.

INDEPENDENCE/INTERDEPENDENCE OF ACTION

Independence/interdependence of action is concerned with the amount of autonomy that a nation maintains in its foreign policy actions. At issue are whether foreign policy actions are taken alone or in concert with other nations, and whether such actions are initiated by a nation or in response to a prior stimulus directed at the nation. Actions taken alone and initiated by the nation are considered to denote independence of action, while actions taken in concert with other nations and in response to a prior direct stimulus denote interdependence of action. In operationalizing independence/interdependence of action, a 3-point scale was developed with 1 representing independence of action or actions that had only one actor and were not elicited behavior, 2 representing actions that were balanced as to independence and interdependence (independent on one aspect, interdependent on the other), and 3 representing interdependence of action or actions that involved multiple actors and elicited behavior. In the present analysis, an average scale score across events occurring during a head of government's tenure was used to indicate independence/interdependence of action.

In some sense, this foreign policy behavior gets at the essence of the conceptual difference between the independent and participatory orientations toward foreign affairs. Heads of government with the independent orientation are likely to want to act alone and to initiate behavior on their own terms. They will seek to maintain autonomy, that is, to control their own national behavior. Such leaders believe that they can have some effect

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on events. Moreover, they distrust the leaders of other nations. These two traits coupled with a desire to maintain their own and their nation's position and power base suggest an emphasis on independence of action. Heads of government with a participatory orientation, on the other hand, are probably willing to relinquish some autonomy or control over their own behavior. An individual (or nation) can benefit from working with rather than against others. Building on their low level of distrust in others, heads of government with a participatory orientation perceive little harm in acting in consort with others if by doing so they can achieve an objective. Moreover, such leaders are likely to be sensitive to stimulation from the environment, picking up on behaviors directed toward them.

Table 5 presents the relationships between the personal characteristics and the independence/interdependence of action scale. (Note that a low score indicates independence, a high score interdependence.) With the exception of heads of government with high interest in foreign affairs, the correlations are in the predicted direction for both the independent and participatory orientations. One of the correlations is significant for the independent orientation with a second approaching significance ($p < .06$). These relationships occur for heads of government with low interest in foreign affairs and for heads of government with much training in foreign affairs. The relationship may be particularly strong for heads of government with training because training enables such leaders to learn how to initiate activity on their own and probably gives them confidence in their ability to act effectively on their own. The two other significant correlations in Table 5 for this variable are for need for power—across all heads of government and for those with low interest. The greater the leaders' need for power, the more independence of action their government exhibits.

The relationships for the participatory orientation may be low, because the emphasis for such heads of government is less on elicited behavior than on acting with other nations. In other words, heads of government with a participatory orientation may be interested in initiating behavior but prefer to include

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TABLE 5

Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Independence/Interdependence of Action Scale

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*	*Low Interest (N = 24)*	*High Interest (N = 21)*	*Little Training (N = 22)*	*Much Training (N = 23)*
Independent Orientation (–)[a]	–.17	–.32*	.12	–.14	–.69***
Participatory Orientation (+)	.17 (.26**)[b]	.14 (.28*)	–.05 (.14)	.17 (.31*)	.18 (.23)
Nationalism (–)	–.13 (–.06)	–.31* (–.08)	.16 (–.05)	–.26 (–.29*)	.02 (.00)
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (–)	.02 (–.15)	–.08 (–.33*)	.17 (.10)	.01 (–.05)	.04 (–.06)
Need Power (–)	–.26**	–.49***	.08	–.28	–.22
Need Affiliation (+)	.21* (.16)	.23 (.04)	.23 (.33*)	.31* (.36**)	.07 (–.02)
Conceptual Complexity (+)	.08 (.24*)	.00 (.31*)	.14 (–.18)	.10 (–.04)	.07 (.38**)
Distrust of Others (–)	.02 (–.20*)	–.16 (–.33*)	.31*(–.04)	.00 (–.39**)	.04 (–.02)

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .10$

a. The sign in parentheses indicates the direction of the hypothesized relationship with independence/interdependence of action: a + sign indicates a positive relationship; a – sign indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship.

b. The numbers in parentheses are the correlations between participatory orientation (and its components) and the percentage of events during a head of government's tenure in office that were initiatives but taken with other nations.

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other nations in their activity. In Table 5 we have reported in parentheses the correlations between participatory orientation (and its component characteristics) and actions involving initiated behavior that were made with other nations. The percentage of such actions during a head of government's tenure in office was the dependent variable. Examining these relationships, we note that one for the participatory orientation is significant and two approach significance. These correlations occur for the sample of heads of government as a whole, for the heads of government with low interest, and for the heads of government with little training. Moreover, all five of the individual personal characteristics involved in the participatory composite have correlations with initiative-multilateral actions that are significant or that approach significance.

COMMITMENT

A commitment is a behavior which limits a government's future capacity to act either because it uses up physical resources, involves pledges of resources in the future, or involves a statement of intent to use resources for a specific purpose. In other words, commitments reduce the pool of available resources for dealing with other problems or generate expectations that limit future behavior. To operationalize commitment, an 11-point scale was developed that builds from verbal statements of desire (scale point of 1) to irreversible use of physical resources (scale point of 11). The average commitment score for events occurring during a head of government's tenure in office was the specific measure used in the present analysis.

By limiting future behavior, commitments reduce the independence and maneuverability of a government's policy makers. They are no longer completely in charge of their nation's behavior. As such, commitments are seen as inappropriate foreign policy behavior by heads of government with an independent orientation. Reducing control over one's resources and putting constraints on one's ability to act, particularly if it involves

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trusting leaders in other nations—this is anathema to independent heads of government. They are interested in increasing their power and maintaining their nations' separateness, not limiting their power and reducing their nation's separateness. On the other hand, the heads of government with a participatory orientation are willing to commit their nations' resources, expecting to gain resources from others that are beneficial to their nations in return. They have no predisposition to distrust the leaders of other nations, figuring cooperation may increase their gain in the long run. Moreover, heads of government with a participatory orientation are less concerned about maintaining their nations' separateness; they are willing to become somewhat dependent on other nations, if such dependencies are built on supportive relationships.

Table 6 presents the relationships between the personal characteristics and commitment. The results are in the predicted direction for both the independent and participatory orientations and are significant for both the whole sample of heads of government and for heads of government with little training. Moreover, the independent orientation is significantly related to commitment for heads of government with low interest.

One of the individual personal characteristics, distrust of others, is significantly related to commitment for the same three groups of heads of government as the independent orientation. As expected, the more distrusting these heads of government were of others, the fewer commitments their nations made. Need for affiliation changes the direction of the relationship with commitment depending on which group of heads of government is analyzed. Need for affiliation is positively related—the predicted direction—when the head of government's interest is low and when training is limited, negatively related when the head of government's interest is high and when there is much training. Interest and training may provide the head of government whose need for affiliation is high with less extreme strategies than commitment for maintaining positive relations with other nations.

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TABLE 6
Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Commitment

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*	*Low Interest (N = 24)*	*High Interest (N = 21)*	*Little Training (N = 22)*	*Much Training (N = 23)*
Independent Orientation (–)[a]	–.32**	–.39**	–.23	–.38**	–.21
Participatory Orientation (+)	.33**	.23	.19	.50***	.06
Nationalism (–)	–.18	–.24	–.12	–.17	–.12
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (–)	–.19	–.30*	–.05	–.45**	.03
Need Power (–)	–.10	–.18	–.03	–.11	–.14
Need Affiliation (+)	–.06	.09	–.24	.25	–.49***
Conceptual Complexity (+)	.07	.01	.17	.06	.11
Distrust of Others (–)	–.25**	–.40**	–.07	–.54***	.11

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

a. The sign in parentheses indicates the direction of the hypothesized relationship with commitment: a + sign indicates a positive relationship; a – sign indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship.

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AFFECT

Affect denotes the feelings ranging from friendliness to hostility which policy-makers of one nation express toward the policies, actions, or government of another nation. A 7-point scale was developed to operationalize affect with one extreme (–3) indicating a strong expression of hostility and the other extreme (+3) indicating a strong expression of friendship. A score of 0 indicated a neutral expression of affect. This scale resulted from combining several variables in the CREON data set which measure the helpfulness or harmfulness of an event to the recipients of the event. Two variables are derivable from the affect scale—the intensity of the expressed affect and the direction of the expressed affect. In the present analysis, intensity was measured by finding an average absolute score (i.e., without regard for the sign of a scale value) for affect across all recipients of the events that occurred during a head of government's tenure in office. Direction of affect was measured by determining the average score (i.e., taking into account the sign of a scale value) for affect across recipients for the events that occurred during a head of government's tenure in office.

Direction and intensity of affect are expected to relate to scores on the independent and participatory orientations in the following manner. Because heads of government with an independent orientation to foreign affairs are interested in emphasizing the differences between their nation and other nations and because they generally distrust the leaders of other nations, they are likely to express negative affect toward other nations, being fairly intense in the expression of such affect. By using such techniques, heads of government with an independent orientation accentuate their separateness and the fact that they maintain control over their own behavior. They move on their own terms; they are their own bosses. Heads of government with a participatory orientation, on the contrary, have as a basic premise of their world-view a desire to maintain friendly relations with others. Moreover, they do not distrust others nor are they overly concerned with the differences between their nation and other na-

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tions. Such heads of government are likely to emphasize the positive in their relations with other nations and to not "rock the boat" by being too intense in the expression of their affect. They perceive that consistent, positive reinforcement to others enables them to participate freely in the international environment. A "low, positive profile" keeps channels and opinions open.

Table 7 presents the relationships between the personal characteristics and direction as well as intensity of affect. The results suggest support for the hypotheses for both orientations. For all groups of heads of government, the correlations are in the predicted direction. Moreover, sixteen of the twenty correlations for the orientations are significant or approach significance. With regard to the individual characteristics, all but belief in one's own ability to control events have correlations in the predicted direction that are significant or approach significance with these two affect variables. The largest number of significant or near significant correlations occur for nationalism and distrust of others.

FEEDBACK FROM THE ENVIRONMENT

How do other nations respond to the foreign policy behavior of a specific nation, i.e., what is the nature of their feedback? Is it favorable or unfavorable, accepting or rejecting? Some of the variables coded in the CREON data set indicate a positive or negative response to another's actions (e.g., acceptance or rejection of a request, reaching or terminating an agreement, statements of pleasure or displeasure with an interaction). By noting whose behavior is being accepted or rejected, we have a way of assessing feedback. In the present analysis, the percentage of feedback that was positive across the years a head of government held office was used to indicate feedback. Given that this specific feedback measure is based on only two types of feedback, a positive correlation suggests more positive than negative feedback; a negative correlation indicates more negative than positive feedback.

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TABLE 7

Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Direction and Intensity of Affect

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*		*Low Interest (N = 24)*		*High Interest (N = 21)*		*Little Training (N = 22)*		*Much Training (N = 23)*	
	Direction	*Intensity*	*Direction*	*Intensity*	*Direction*	*Intensity*	*Direction*	*Intensity*	*Direction*	*Intensity*
Independent Orientation (–) (+)[a]	–.40***	.32**	–.61***	.31*	–.06	.34*	–.18	.22	–.57***	.44**
Participatory Orientation (+) (–)	.39***	–.36***	.47***	–.71***	.21	–.31*	.31*	–.31*	.52***	–.44**
Nationalism (–) (+)	–.33**	.30**	–.44**	.35**	–.17	.28	–.40**	.30*	–.28*	.27
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (–) (+)	–.11	–.02	–.26	.00	.17	–.01	–.08	.01	–.13	.09
Need Power (–) (+)	–.33**	.24*	–.61***	.35**	.09	.12	–.40**	.24	–.23	.26
Need Affiliation (+) (–)	.14	–.18	.05	–.41**	.32*	.06	.31*	–.32*	–.10	–.06
Conceptual Complexity (+) (–)	.20*	–.05	.19	.05	–.04	–.38**	–.03	–.13	.38**	–.03
Distrust of Others (–) (+)	–.25**	.27**	–.35**	.31*	–.10	.22	–.15	.22	–.39**	.36**

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

a. The signs in parentheses indicate the direction of the hypothesized relationships with affect: a + sign indicates a positive relationship; a – sign indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship. The first sign denotes the hypothesized relationship with direction of affect; the second sign denotes the hypothesized relationship with intensity of affect.

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Our hypotheses for feedback follow from the previous hypotheses on affect. Heads of government with an independent orientation to foreign affairs are prone to actions that are negative in tone and fairly intense. Such behavior is likely to elicit mirror image behavior from other nations if they bother to respond at all. Because more independent heads of government do not develop relations with other nations and seek to maintain an independent status in the international arena, it may be easy to reject their behavior. There are fewer strings attached and probably fewer repercussions to such a rejection than would be the case with a more involved nation. Turning this rationale around, we expect more positive feedback for heads of government with a participatory orientation. Such heads of government tend to be positive toward other nations, eliciting positive behavior in return. Moreover, heads of government with a participatory orientation actively involve their nations in the international system so that a rejection of their nation's behavior may have repercussions not desired by the responding nation. If any feedback is to be given, positive feedback is probably safest.

Table 8 shows the relationships that were found between the personal characteristics and feedback. For all the groups of heads of government except those with high interest in foreign affairs, the correlations were in the predicted direction for the independent and participatory orientations. Of those eight relations in the predicted direction, one was significant and four approached significance. The significant correlation occurred for heads of government with low interest in foreign affairs.

Only need for affiliation in the individual characteristics does not have a correlation with feedback that is significant or approaches significance. For nationalism, need for power, and distrust of others, the correlations are reversed in sign for heads of government with low and high interest and for heads of government with little and much training. The correlations are all negative, as hypothesized, for heads of government with low interest and for heads of government with little training, but they are positive for heads of government with high interest and for heads of government with much training. Interest and training may

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TABLE 8

Relationships Between Personal Characteristics and Rate of Positive Feedback

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*	*Low Interest (N = 24)*	*High Interest (N = 21)*	*Little Training (N = 22)*	*Much Training (N = 23)*
Independent Orientation (–)[a]	–.22*	–.42**	.11	–.29*	–.11
Participatory Orientation (+)	.22*	.26	–.02	.29*	.12
Nationalism (–)	.04	–.18	.38**	–.29*	.38**
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events (–)	–.13	–.20	–.14	–.02	–.36**
Need Power (–)	–.16	–.44**	.20	–.35*	.13
Need Affiliation (+)	.09	.07	.19	.23	–.06
Conceptual Complexity (+)	.29**	.27*	.00	.19	.38**
Distrust of Others (–)	.03	–.24	.47**	–.18	.29*

*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

a. The sign in parentheses indicates the direction of the hypothesized relationship with rate of positive feedback: a + sign indicates a positive relationship; a – sign indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship.

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increase the foreign policy stature of heads of government with these characteristics and/or make them more adept in foreign policy-making so that positive rather than negative feedback is directed toward their nations.

Conclusions

The research reported in this article has examined how six personal characteristics of heads of government interact to form two orientations to foreign affairs. Based on a set of premises about the ways heads of government with these two orientations will urge their governments to act, we have related the two orientations to six foreign policy behaviors. Table 9 summarizes the relationships that were found between the orientations and the foreign policy variables, as well as the relationships between the individual personal characteristics and the foreign policy variables. An examination of this table suggests several conclusions from the research.

Among the personal characteristics, the independent orientation had the largest number of significant ($p<.05$) or nearly significant ($p<.10$) correlations in the predicted direction with the foreign policy variables—53% of the correlations with the independent orientation had a $p<.10$. In second place was the participatory orientation with 47% of its correlations having a $p<.10$. The two orientations to foreign affairs in their own right would appear to represent important dimensions in explaining foreign policy behavior. Heads of government with these two orientations influenced the foreign policy behavior of their governments in specific ways.

None of the individual personal characteristics has as many correlations with the foreign policy behaviors that have a $p<.10$ in the predicted direction as the two orientations. Of the individual characteristics, nationalism and need for power have the largest number of such correlations with a $p<.10$—40%. Need for affiliation and distrust of others follow a close second with 33% of their correlations having a $p<.10$. Belief in one's own

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TABLE 9

Summary of Relationships with $p < .10$ for Personal Characteristics by Groups of Heads of Government

Personal Characteristic	*Over Whole Sample (N = 45)*	*Low Interest (N = 24)*	*High Interest (N = 21)*	*Little Training (N = 22)*	*Much Training (N = 23)*	*Total*
Independent Orientation	C, DA, IA, +F	I/I, C, DA, IA, +F	IA	POC, C, +F	POC(−), I/I, DA, IA	17 (16, 1−)
Participatory Orientation	C, DA, IA, +F	DA, IA	IA	POC, C, DA, IA, +F	DA, IA	14
Nationalism	POC, DA, IA	POC, I/I, DA, IA	+F(−)	POC, DA, IA, +F	DA, +F(−)	14 (12, 2−)
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events		C		C	+F	3
Need Power	POC, I/I, DA, IA	POC, I/I, DA, IA, +F		POC, DA, +F		12
Need Affiliation	POC, I/I	IA	POC, DA	I/I, DA, IA	POC, C	10
Conceptual Complexity	POC(−), DA, +F	POC(−), +F	POC(−), IA		POC(−), DA, +F	10 (6, 4−)
Distrust of Others	C, DA, IA	C, DA, IA	I/I(−), +F(−)	POC, C	DA, IA, +F(−)	13 (10, 3−)
Total	23 (22, 1−)	23 (22, 1−)	9 (5, 4−)	21	17 (13, 4−)	93 (83, 10−)

Note: The initials in the table stand for the following foreign policy variables—POC = professed orientation to change, I/I = independence/interdependence of action, C = commitment, DA = direction of affect, IA = intensity of affect, +F = positive feedback. A minus sign in the parentheses following the initials of a foreign policy variable indicates that the correlation was in the reverse direction of that predicted. A minus sign following a number in the totals column or row indicates the number of correlations that were in the reverse direction of that predicted.

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ability to control events appears to have had the least impact on these foreign policy behaviors with only 10% of its correlations having a $p < .10$ in the predicted direction.

Turning to the columns in Table 9, that is, to the types of heads of government who were studied, we note that our expectation with regard to training in foreign affairs was supported. There were more relationships between the personal characteristics and foreign policy behaviors for heads of government with little training that had a $p < .10$ than for heads of government with much training. Our hypothesis was, however, not confirmed for interest in foreign affairs—in the low interest condition, rather than the high interest condition, more of the correlations between the personal characteristics and foreign policy variables achieved a $p < .10$.

The results suggest the need to reconceptualize the impact of interest in foreign affairs on the relationship between personal characteristics and foreign policy behavior. Much like the lack of training in foreign affairs, low interest appears to provide heads of government with little to tap but their predispositions when they must make a foreign policy decision. With high interest in foreign affairs, the heads of government have probably read about, discussed, and formulated positions on foreign policy issues before taking office, and, after taking office, have kept themselves informed on problems in the foreign policy arena. They have developed some basis on which to make a decision other than their predispositions. Interest, like training, appears to increase the range of activities which heads of government can consider in dealing with foreign affairs. Instead of relying on strategies and styles dictated by their personal orientations, interested heads of government have a choice of several ways of acting and some knowledge of the probable outcomes when these alternative strategies and styles are used. Interested heads of government have a broader repertoire of possible behaviors.

Before leaving this discussion of interest and training, we should note that we learned as much about the particular foreign policy variables examined in this research by focusing on the sample of heads of government as a whole as from looking at the

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effects of interest and training in foreign affairs. The numbers of correlations with $p < .10$ are virtually the same for the whole sample as for those heads of government with little interest or with little training. In other words, the relationships between these personal characteristics and foreign policy behaviors tend to show up without taking such mediating variables as training or interest in foreign affairs into account. However, a closer examination of the correlations indicates that they are stronger —the personal characteristics account for a larger percentage of the variance in the foreign policy behaviors—for heads of government with little interest or with little training in foreign affairs than for the whole sample of heads of government. Whereas none of the correlations exceeds .45 (or accounts for 20% or more of the variance) for the whole sample of heads of government, nearly one-fifth of the correlations for heads of government with little interest are equal to or exceed .45, and one-tenth of the correlations for heads of government with little training are equal to or exceed .45. Specifying the conditions under which personal characteristics can affect foreign policy behavior appears to enhance the explanatory power of the personal characteristics.

We have examined in this study the direct effects of leaders' personal characteristics on their governments' foreign policy behavior and several conditions that appear to enhance this direct effect. Many other conditioning variables can be posited (see Hermann, 1976, 1978; Hermann and Hermann, 1979). Some other possible enhancing conditions involve being a predominant as opposed to nonpredominant leader (i.e., having a disproportionately large amount of power in the government), being part of a cohesive as opposed to a fragmented regime, facing an ambiguous as opposed to a structured situation, and having to deal with a small as opposed to a large bureaucracy. An important objective of the CREON Project, of which this study is a part, is the building of integrative links among these types of variables in explaining governments' foreign policy behavior. We are interested in developing models showing how national attributes, regime factors, decision structures and processes, situational variables, and external relationships interrelate in affecting

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foreign policy activities (see Salmore et al., 1978). The present study suggests that the personal characteristics and orientations to foreign affairs of political leaders are worth including in this integrative effort. It is, however, only a first step in the process of trying to explain why governments do certain things in the foreign policy arena.

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